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Abstract
After the collapse of ex-Yugoslavia, Croatia inherited a ‘premature’ socialist pay-as-
you-go pension system. During the early 1990s, it was used more extensively than else-
where in Central and Eastern Europe to ease the pains of the country’s transition to a 
market economy, thereby leaving Croatian pensions in dire need of reforms. This article 
will try to meticulously describe the reform process during the period 1991-2006, which 
was characterised by three relatively independent phases: the first, a retrenchment phase, 
which condemned a majority of pensioners to old-age poverty; the second, a restructur-
ing phase, which led, under the aegis of international financial institutions, to the legis-
lation of radical reforms; and the third, a populist phase, which undid most of the previ-
ous efforts. The article will conclude that this concoction of poverty, agency capture and 
crony capitalism had a common denominator, that is the struggle for power during the 
country’s democratic consolidation.
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1 Design and hypotheses
1.1 Basic design and regulation of the system in 2007
The Croatian pension system in 2007 is a good representative of the hybridisation 
process that occurred in the Nordic (and Central European) cluster (Natali, 2004:19-20). 
Croatia relies now on a multipillar structure, based on the classic World Bank 1994 rec-
ipe. However, interesting incongruous elements are present within the country’s system, 
which has created vast political problems.
The first pillar is pay-as-you-go (PAYG) and maintains actuarial fairness through 
the use of a ‘German point system’, an advanced defined benefit (DB) formula based on 
life-time earnings. A second, mandatory funded pillar was carved out from the first one 
and rendered obligatory for insureds below 40 and optional for those aged between 40 
and 50. The third is instead voluntary and comprises individual as well as occupational 
schemes. Therefore, two systems (the old PAYG and the new multi-pillar one) have co-
existed in Croatia since 2002.
Behind this apparently spotless façade lie a number of unresolved issues, which are 
related to the socialist and early Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) inheritance as well 
as to insufficient courage in tackling reform details. 
The greatest problem burdening the Croatian pension system is the extremely unfa-
vourable system dependency ratio (SDR), which reached its nadir at 1.36 in 20001, there-
by rendering fiscal sustainability impossible without a drastic reduction in replacement 
rates. The net replacement rate was 37.62 in 2000, breaching ILO Convention 102 and 
meaning that some 700.000 pensioners were close to abject poverty. The situation will 
not improve until the 2nd pillar becomes fully operational and thus a bitter dispute over 
a presumed discrimination between ‘old’ and ‘new’ pensioners erupted during the 2007 
pre-electoral period. 
Moreover, it is questionable whether the funded pillar will resolve anything at all, 
given the low contribution rate of 5%. The World Bank originally planned to raise it over 
time, as with Hungary, but Finance Minister Borislav Škegro, who feared the ensuing 
transition costs, blocked the attempt (Anušić and Mintas Hodak, interview). Only now is 
the executive timidly rethinking this strategy (Vlada RH, 2006:48). However, low con-
tributions are only one problem afflicting the second pillar. Administrative fees are high, 
competition is limited, investment limits are too stringent and naturally bounded by an 
underdeveloped capital market. The lack of tax deductions for employers in the third pil-
lar does not help. In addition, as will be extensively shown, the system continues to be 
vulnerable to special interest group demands and captures, and no current political coali-
tion is capable of unshackling it.
Thus the Croatian is a troubled system, which leads us to a concoction of poverty, tram-
pling of fundamental rights, agency capture and crony capitalism, which have as a common 
denominator the struggle for power during the country’s democratic consolidation. 
1 Some claim that the actual SDR was even lower: 1.00 taking account of employees whose firms failed to pay 
salaries, 0.70 if redundant workers are excluded (Marković, 1999). Of course, these extreme values are not demogra-
phically generated, they are mainly the result of an inconsiderate early retirement policy, which only the 1998 Pensi-
on Insurance Act (ZOMO) managed to stop. 97
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1.2 Hypotheses on the development of the system
The tale of Croatian pension reforms is not only one of failed starts and major de-
lays, but also of deep politicisation of the pension issue and its instrumental use for solv-
ing major public finance problems and thereby its inability to fulfil its basic task of pro-
viding social security to the elderly. 
Starting with a premature Yugoslav PAYG system and an underdeveloped economic 
situation, Croatia legislated a radical multipillar reform. Deep financial crises delayed its 
implementation, giving a misleading impression of gradualism, whereas reforms were at 
times brutal to losers (Županov, 1996) and mostly captured by winners. The reform ap-
proach was elitist and imposed: social partners experienced ‘dialogue’ as ‘instructions’ 
and ‘external conditionality’ as ‘a dictate’ (Maršić, 2004:87-88).2 Notwithstanding, Cara-
na Corporation (Hurd, 2003:3) labelled the final result as a “tremendous success and one 
of the best reforms in Croatia to date”.
Changes were discontinuous, but can be grouped into three main phases. 
The first one was a sweeping attempt at retrenchment enacted within the 1993 stabi-
lisation package. While ineffective due to concomitant populist measures, it pushed most 
of the retired population into abject poverty. These unilateral cutbacks prepared the stage 
for a controversial Constitutional Court decision, which set in motion mechanisms of such 
perversity as to be still, ten years after, distracting Croatian politics from the more press-
ing problems of the country. 
The second phase was the result of much involvement by international financial 
institutions and it encompassed a major overhaul of the Croatian pension system with 
the 1998 Pension Insurance Act (Narodne Novine – Official Gazette, NN, 102/98), the 
1999 Compulsory and Voluntary Pension Funds Act (more briefly the Funds Act; NN 
49/99) and the subsequent Annuities Law (OG 106/99). The three acts retrenched the 
PAYG system and introduced two supplementary funded pillars. Implementation fol-
lowed much later – in June 2002 the new regime officially started operating – which 
is telling about the preparedness of Croatia for a capitalised scheme. The end result 
was admittedly shaped upon World Bank recommendations, which had supported a 
partial privatisation since late 1995 (Rismondo, 1997). Technically, the paradigmatic 
shift was impeccable; socially, it was altogether another story. 
The last phase is characterised by a losers’ backlash, a rupture in the established path 
departure (Aleksandrowicz, 2006). After three pensioners’ associations signed a social 
agreement granting electoral support to the Social Democratic Party of Croatia (SDP) and 
the Croatian Social Liberal Party (HSLS) before the 2000 elections (Matković, 1999e) 
and after the Croatian Pensioners Party (HSU) entered the governing coalition with the 
HDZ in late 2003 (HSU, 2003), the reversal of some reform measures became firmly en-
trenched at the top of the agenda. During implementation, the Croatian state proved too 
weak to react to interest groups’ multiple captures. It is admitted that reform outcomes 
are jeopardised.
2 However, opinions on the quality of concertation vary substantially, see later paragraphs.98
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The chapter will be structured as follows. First, the chronology of pension system re-
forms will be presented with a strong emphasis on implementation.3 The latter official-
ly started in January 1999 and witnessed the consolidation of vested interests originating 
outside – the financial and grey lobbies – and within the state – parts of the public admin-
istration and narrow electoral constituencies. These pressures will be analysed and the 
main actors will be dissected in the second, dedicated part of the chapter. The narration 
will reveal how the power of the executive, or better, the lack of it was ultimately respon-
sible for the degeneration of implementation in Croatia.
2. Evolution of the pension system
While Croatia shared up until 1990 all Yugoslav federal legislation, some legal dif-
ferences persisted, since federal laws set guidelines rather than firm rules and it was up 
to individual republics to adapt them to specific needs. Another point of departure was 
the radically different gross social product (GSP) rates marking the republics’ different 
levels of development. In addition, contingent events, such as the Homeland War and the 
HDZ rule, delineated a drastically distinct transition in Croatia. Pensions reflected this 
accordingly. 
2.1 The Croatian troubled transition
Croatian transition challenges were, before the collapse of the Yugoslav federation, 
similar to those of other self-determining post-socialist states (democratisation, marketi-
sation, independence and creating a national from a regional economy); however, the eth-
no-nationalist struggle marked the involution that Croatian economics and politics under-
went during the period running from independence, on 25 June 1991, until the electoral 
defeat of the HDZ in early 2000.
Transformation was at its inception characterised by an ‘endogenous transition’ or a 
‘ruptura pactada’, as the League of Communists of Croatia (SKH) introduced multiparty 
politics in December 1989. However, Serbian nationalism managed to steer Croatia clear 
of this course. The founding elections saw the nationalist and populist HDZ opposed to 
the SKH-SDP (Party of Democratic Changes), the SKH successor. HDZ prevailed due to 
two main factors: a) the party embodied Croatian historical radicalism and its leader and 
founder, former Yugoslav National Army general and nationalist dissident Franjo Tuđman, 
staunchly stood against Serbian hegemony, thereby appealing to the Croatian majority and 
deliberately seeking the support of émigrés; b) the opposition was weak; the SKH-SDP 
was deeply split between reformers and dogmatists and hence did not appear to be cred-
ible, since on the one hand it advocated democratic reforms and, on the other, bet on the 
federation’s survival to attract non-Croatian voters (Zakošek, 1997).
The April-May 1990 elections witnessed a landslide victory by the HDZ, which took 
power on 30 May. A communist single-party regime was replaced by an anti-commu-
3 2002 marked the 80th anniversary of pension insurance in Croatia, and for this purpose the edited book ‘80 
godina mirovinskog osiguranja u Hrvatskoj’ (80 years of pension insurance in Croatia) was published by the Croatian 
Institute for Pension Insurance (HZMO). Without it and without the help of its editor, Mihovil Rismondo, delineating 
the transition of the Croatian system from socialism to the present would have proved almost impossible.99
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nist single-party government. The newly established ‘ethnic-nation state’ soon degener-
ated towards an institutionalisation of the nationalist movement and concomitant de-in-
stitutionalisation of the governing apparatus, or better its confusion with the HDZ. A ‘hy-
brid regime’ that defied categorisation was created (Grubiša, 2002: 33-36; Kasapović and 
Zakošek, 1997: 27-29). The election of Tuđman as president of Croatia, the outbreak of 
the Homeland War and the triumphant operation Oluja only strengthened the HDZ posi-
tion. This pushed Croatia into a phase of authoritarian regression. It took almost a decade 
for the SKH-SDP, renamed the Social Democratic Party of Croatia (SDP) in April 1994, 
to reorganise and win an election in coalition with the HSLS.
In the corporatist arena, the involution was similarly drastic. The HDZ’s authoritar-
ian style was based on an aut aut to the old elites: cooptation or exit. This meant a com-
plete disruption of the already weakened social dialogue, which only by 2001, under the 
SDP, saw a resurgence, with the conclusion of the Agreement on the Economic and So-
cial Council and other forms of social partnership. However, the general opinion of trade 
unions is rather negative, as the government avoids responsibility, does not consult or en-
ter into real negotiations and presents already drafted laws. By the same token, the idea 
of constructive social partnership was wiped out during the 1990s, also due to the Labour 
Code which permits the establishment of a trade union or employer association with just 
ten members. Trade unions are thus very fractioned and loosely divided into six repre-
sentative confederations:
Table 1 Croatian trade union confederations in 2004
Name Acronym Reported membership in 2004
Union of Autonomous Trade Unions of Croatia SSSH 211,205
Association of Croatian Public Service Unions MATICA 55,830
Independent Croatian Unions NHS 91,000
Croatian Trade Union Associations HUS 40,000
Association of Workers’ Trade Unions of Croatia URSH 60,000
Trade Union of Services UNI-CRO 20,099
Source: CARDS (2005:50-72)
Considering the adverse conditions – the war and the international embargo – the 
Croatian economy was relatively successful, apart from its underwhelming employment 
record. By 2000, 80% of state owned enterprises (SOEs) were privatised, hyperinflation was 
eliminated by late 1993 and some structural reforms were successfully carried out (price 
liberalisation, introduction of VAT, major pension reforms). Even the two macroeconomic 
crises were dealt with satisfactorily. However, Croatia was seen as an international pariah, 
because it developed endemic and systemic crony capitalism, which allowed for state cap-
ture, rent-seeking and misallocation of resources (Bićanić and Franičević, 2003:14-23).
These two authors claim that the causes for this involution are to be found in both the 
institutional inheritance of Yugoslavia (state paternalism, the collapse of vital markets) 100
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and wrong policy choices, sometimes backed by international financial institutions, such 
as too tight monetary policy and fixed exchange rates. In the end, crony capitalism was 
self-defeating as it started generating decreasing returns for both the population (through 
continuous crises and recession) and tycoons (by not providing secure property rights). 
By 2000 its delegitimation was complete and the expected performance betrayed, there-
by providing opposition parties with a credible anti-platform upon which to base their 
electoral campaign. 
2.2 From the old system to the 1993 stabilisation package
The consolidation of self-management and decentralisation in Yugoslavia deeply af-
fected Croatian pensions via the 1982 federal Pension and Disability Insurance Funda-
mental Rights Act and its republican counterpart, the Pension and Disability Insurance 
Act (PDIA), which entered into force in July 1983. Croatian pension and disability insur-
ance was organised into three ‘self-managed communities of interest’ for: a) workers; b) 
self-employed artisans, caterers and carriers; c) self-employed farmers.4 On 15 October 
1990, as a consequence to the amendments to the Croatian Constitution, the communities 
were re-established and renamed Republican Funds (Rismondo, 2002: 64-74).5 Of these, 
the Workers’ Fund was by far the largest.
Table 2 Membership of Republican Funds in 1998
Insured % structure Beneficiaries  % structure SDR
Workers’ Fund 1.228,576 86.67 868,131 90.87 1.42
Self-employed Fund 80,021 5.65 20,226 2.12 3.96
Farmers’ Fund 108,912 7.68 66,995 7.01 1.63
Total 1.417,509 100.00 955,352 100.00 1.48
Source: Ott (2001:66).
As in the rest of Yugoslavia, benefits were calculated on an individual basis, there-
by permitting a greater dispersion of income. The system was financed by employer and 
employee contributions; and the Croatian budget assumed responsibility for expenditures 
previously paid by the SFRY budget (for combatants in the National Liberation Struggle, 
personal achievements and the police), newly established merit pensions (see Tab. 5), all 
of which caused growing deficits in the funds. Therefore, in principle the successors of 
the Yugoslav pension system were lavishly Bismarckian and in great need of a thorough 
rethinking of their incentive structure. Since the ageing of the Croatian population was 
not the primary concern, a timely tightening of all eligibility criteria would have proba-
bly prevented the collapse.
4 The latter two were rendered autonomous in 1969 and 1980, respectively. 
5 For simplicity, until the merger of the three into HZMO in 1999, the acronym RFMO – Republički fond miro-
vinskog i invalidskog osiguranja radnika Hrvatske – will be used for the Croatian Workers’ Pension and Disability 
Insurance Fund.101
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Notwithstanding this, by November 1995, no serious discussion on reforms had been 
undertaken. Quite the contrary, the pension system was abandoned to the arbitrariness of 
policymakers, who (ab)used it as a populist favour-granting cashbox and simultaneous-
ly crushed it to alleviate the fiscal imbalances of the Croatian budget. Thus, the Workers’ 
Fund witnessed two opposite trends: a massive increase of pension expenditures and, si-
multaneously, a collapse in average replacement rates.
2.2.1 The pensioner stampede
Social security populism was not the most vicious bane of the Croatian pension sys-
tem. The chief problem was the severe recession following the Yugoslav break-up and the 
ensuing Homeland War, which brought the whole economy to its knees. Unemployment, 
especially among men, increased dramatically.
Table 3 Unemployment in Croatia (in thousands)
Year 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Total 
unemployment 139.9 160.6 253.7 266.6 250.8 243.3 240.6 261.0 277.7
Female 
unemployment 83.4 91.4 133.0 141.3 138.4 130.5 124.2 129.6 137.3
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Total 
unemployment
287.8 321.9 357.9 380.2 389.7 329.8 309.9 308.7 291.6
Female 
unemployment
149.3 169.1 188.5 203.4 213.0 189.7 180.8 180.8 175.1
Source: Republic of Croatia - Central Bureau of Statistics, various years Statistical Yearbook
Widespread corruption, barriers to entry into the system, high contribution rates (see 
Tab. 6) triggered two intertwined phenomena: the informalisation of the economy and 
massive evasion of contributions, which was concentrated according to sector and work 
category (Bejaković, 2002:335-338). Waivers on contributions supported shipyard re-
habilitation. War veterans, their families, the police and army were all granted exemp-
tions without reductions in entitlements. Certain types of income (honoraria, per diems) 
did not constitute a taxable base for contributions. Self-employed and farmers registered 
lower compliance rates also due to failure in adjusting their minimum taxable incomes to 
nominal wages (Anušić, O’Keefe and Madžarević-Šujster, 2003:19). Another, probably 
involuntary, source was a messy data and contribution collection system. Multiple agen-
cies with overlapping functions, overstretched audit and the asynchrony between monthly 
contribution and yearly data collection, leading to protracted delays in monitoring,6 lay at 
6 As Dunja Vidošević became director of HZMO in February 1999, she soon discovered unclaimed credits from 
as early as 1995. She was the first systematically to analyse the Institute’s asset and liability structure. However, her 
impact was limited, since informatisation of HZMO started only towards the end of her period of office (Matković, 
interview).102
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the core of SOEs not contributing or forging data and standing little chance of being per-
secuted (Bejaković, 2004:69-70).
Moreover, the pension system was extensively used as a buffer for redundant or un-
employed workers, the displaced, and to award merit pensions. Its SDR witnessed the 
spectacular deterioration shown in Tab. 4, its inverse dropping to 1.36 by 2000, one of 
the lowest in the world and far out of line with the Croatian age structure (World Bank, 
1997:78). In fact, had the 1970-1990 Workers’ Fund trends7 continued, there would have 
been 2.58 workers per pensioner in 2000. Instead, insureds fell by almost 30% and ben-
eficiaries increased by 55% during the 1990s. 















1990 321¸3 20.8b 166.1 -4.510b 655.8 7.110b 1.968.7 -3.1b 3.00
1991 353.4 10.0 182.6 9.9 719.9 9.8 1.839.3 -6.6 2.56
1992 399.4 13.0 183.0 0.2 774.9 7.7 1.724.8 -6.2 2.23
1993 419.3 5.0 182.1 -0.5 794.8 2.6 1.698.1 -1.5 2.14
1994 440.2 5.0 185.7 2.0 825.1 3.8 1.621.9 -4.5 1.97
1995 443.0 0.6 190.2 2.4 865.8 4.9 1.568.0 -3.3 1.81
1996 457.6 3.3 191.4 0.6 888.8 2.7 1.479.0 -5.7 1.66
1997 477.6 4.4 198.1 3.4 925.5 4.1 1.468.9 -0.7 1.59
1998 495.7 3.8 201.2 1.6 955.3 3.2 1.471.5 0.2 1.54
1999 518.0 4.5 235.4 17.0 1.017.8 6.5 1.406.1 -4.4 1.38
2000 531.5 2.6 237.5 0.9 1.018.5 0.1 1.380.5 -1.8 1.36
2001 539.6 1.5 237.6 0.0 1.032.1 1.3 1.402.2 1.6 1.36
2002 546.6 1.3 235.5 -0.9 1.042.2 1.0 1.422.0 1.4 1.36
2003 554.0 1.3 236.1 0.3 1.054.5 1.2 1.444.0 1.5 1.37
2004 556.7 0.5 238.2 0.9 1.065.7 1.1 1.460.1 1.1 1.37
2005 564.0 1.3 234.8 -1.4 1.080.6 1.4 1.498.9 2.7 1.39
a The column contains data for both old-age pensions and early retirement.
b Data for 1989-1990.
Source: HZMO (2006).
This lavishness had multiple origins. On the one hand, the inherited system was overly 
generous. Low retirement ages – 60 for men and 55 for women with 20 years of pension-
qualifying period; 65 and 60 with only 15 years of insurance period or any age with 40 
7 The Fund’s SDR declined from 3.43 in 1970 to 2.83 in 1990.103
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and 35 years of pension-qualifying period – were coupled with ever lighter penalties for 
early retirement. In fact, the exceedingly low8 and temporary 1.33% decrement per year 
missing to the minimum pensionable age was lowered in 1989 to 0.5% for those who were 
laid off as a consequence of bankruptcy or liquidation (HZMO, 2002:65).
Merit pensions, some of which inherited from the former Yugoslav budget, swelled as 
a consequence of the war.9 Lax, decentralised and unsupervised assessments of Homeland 
War combatant and disability statuses marked a higher than expected inflow of new pen-
sioners – especially during 1995, right after the truce – a major problem alongside baby-
boomers (Puljiz, interview).10 Since a Homeland War combatant average insurance peri-
od is 12 years and the average pension is 5,510 kuna, they will more than counterweight 
those savings deriving from slowed growth in overall merit pensions. By 2005, the bene-
ficiaries of privileged pensions exceeded 16% of total pensioners, and their pensions were 
some 2.4% GDP, which is more than 20% of overall HZMO spending. 
Table 5 Merit pensions 1998-2005
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 NRRa
WWII veterans 76,636 73,466 72,382 70,712 74,668 68,206 63,712 59,244 50.84
Police and judiciary 12,791 12,816 13,679 14,257 13,980 16,567 16,633 16,560 74.82
Members of 
government 144 126 125 100 408 524 486 444 48.51
Croatian Academy of 
Sciences and Arts 87 79 81 82 108 152 163 167 154.93
WWII Home Guard 
veterans 35,614 34,090 33,932 32,788 28,705 30,102 28,584 26,967 42.9
Members of the former 
Yugoslav National Army 16,667 16,217 15,784 15,467 14,947 14,467 14,057 13,542 58.34
Former political 
prisoners 3,972 5,668 5,976 5,893 5,772 5,765 5,807 5,778 76.74
Members of 
parliament 119 112 119 121 269 296 336 354 198.26
Croatian Army 2,237 2,364 2,769 3,783 6,676 7,919 6,814 11,265 65.15
Veterans from the 
Croatian Homeland War 22,612 26,110 28,551 29,300 29,425 32,249 36,559 39,821 123.18
Total 170,879 171,048 173,398 172,503 174,958 176,247 173,151 174,142
a Average pension per category on average wage in 2005. Regular NRR amounted to 41.8 in 2005. 
Differences between privileged and civilian disability are marked as well.
Source: HZMO.
8 According to Anušić, O’Keefe and Madžarević-Šujster (2003:27), international experience indicates that sui-
table annual and permanent decrements should be 5% or more. 
9 For a complete account of different privileges, see Gulin (2002).
10 The abuses became so blatant that the RFMO soon imposed a six-month waiting period and heightened cen-
tral supervision over regional offices. Results were, however, meagre (World Bank, 1997:79). 104
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A special scheme (OG 25/90), allowing for very generous buyouts of missing insur-
ance periods of up to five years, was established in June 1990. Employers used it as a 
substitute to labour market adjustments until 1995, when it was discontinued by the new 
Labour Code (OG 38/95). Some 100 thousand workers aged 51 on average, represent-
ing 20-25% of jobs lost during transition, purchased roughly 175,000 years of service 
(Andrijašević, Kovačević and Sabolović, 1997:241; World Bank, 1997:78).
Another ‘populist’ directive granted longer insurance periods (up to 18 months) per 
insured year to a series of professions, usually involving unhealthy and risky jobs, or due 
to personal unfavourable psychophysical conditions. Under socialist Yugoslavia, work cat-
egories were abolished and the list currently in use was drawn in 1999 (Zakon o stažu osig-
uranja s povećanim trajanjem, NN 71/99). Other beneficiaries (police officers, professional 
soldiers, fire-fighters and bomb disposal personnel) were regulated by special law.
For completeness, it is worth mentioning Art. 243 of the Labour Code, which grant-
ed early retirement to all disabled persons who had residual working capabilities, but who 
were laid off due to the impossibility of reemployment. This practice lasted from January 
1996 until the Pension Insurance Act entered into force in January 1999. 
2.2.2 Financing the collapse
In order to finance the system’s generosity cum deterioration, three strategies were 
used. Two tried to refinance the system: contribution rates were progressively increased 
(see Tab. 6) and some 15% of total privatisation assets were assigned to RFMO in 1992, 
unrealistically hoping that they would generate revenues. The third introduced radical cut-
backs. At the height of economic crisis, PM Nikica Valentić launched his (in)famous sta-
bilisation programme, whose effects are still felt today.
Table 6 Changes in contribution ratesa










Employees 16.70 9.50 11.00 13.50 12.75 10.75 10.75c 20.00c
Employees 7.40 9.00 11.00 13.50 12.75 10.75 8.75 0.00
Total 24.10 18.50 22.00 27.00 25.50 21.50 19.50 20.00
a These are not the rates effectively financing pensions. In 1995-97, some 5.5% were diverted by 
RFMO to the Croatian Health Insurance Institute (HZZO) to finance health care of retired persons.
b These still refer to personal and work organisations’ income. Payroll contributions were intro-
duced in 1991.
c Total employee contributions. If participation in the 2nd pillar is chosen, then 1st pillar employee 
contributions are respectively 5.75 and 15.00. The remaining 5.00 goes to the funded pillar. 
Source: HZMO (2002: 93) and Pravilnik o doprinosima za obvezna osiguranja, NN, 01/05 
2.2.2.1 RFMO and ownership transformation
According to the Socially-owned Enterprises Transformation Act (NN 19/91), all but 
10 major Croatian enterprises were given one year to transform into joint-stock companies 105
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and eventually prepare a privatisation plan. Manager and employee buyouts were given 
top priority, while unsold shares as well as stakes in limited liability companies were of-
fered to some institutional investors. The Workers’ and Farmers’ Funds were allotted 60 
and 30% respectively, while the Self-employed Fund was assigned 10% of the pension-
ers’ portfolio. In order to trade with these assets, the Funds established in April 1992 the 
joint-stock company Croatian Pension Insurance (HMO)11. By 1998, the cumulative nom-
inal value of transferred assets amounted to DEM 4.2B (HZMO, 2002:81-82).
The initial hopes were for these assets to produce enough returns to resume full in-
dexation. However, the World Bank (1997:82-83) maintained that this expectation was 
unrealistic at best. Under optimal conditions, the returns generated by the Croatian Pen-
sion Insurance returns should have covered some 5% of annual spending. Instead, the 
actual figure stood at 2.1% in 1995, thereby implying that the assigned assets were seri-
ously overvalued, the restructuring of underlying companies was delayed and corporate 
governance neglected. 
On the whole, the importance of privatisation assets for Croatian pension reforms re-
mained very marginal, however, the scandals surrounding the management of the Croatian 
Pension Insurance Institute considerably undermined pensioners’ confidence in the in-
stitution and consolidated the view, often reiterated by pensioner associations, that the 
HDZ had stripped pensioners of their belongings through ‘scam privatisation’ (Bejaković, 
interview).12 
2.2.2.2 Beyond stabilisation
The violent conflict with neighbouring Serbia that erupted soon after the achievement 
of independence reduced the Croatian economy to a shambles. International financial in-
stitutions did not lend the country support, thus foreign capital inflows were frozen due to 
high risk. The damage included the tourist industry’s ceasing to operate. As the new PM 
Nikica Valentić took office in April 1993, his government’s paramount task was to build 
an anti-inflationary reputation in order to be able to fend off interest groups that might 
oppose a stabilisation programme. 
The programme was kept secret until 3 October 1993, the day of the announcement, 
to prevent foreign exchange speculation. It entailed three stages: a short-run inflation re-
duction, through a fiscal and monetary squeeze, followed by structural reforms to main-
tain a low inflationary equilibrium (pension reform was part of the third, long-term stage). 
The first stage functioned magnificently: by November inflation fell to 1.4% and producer 
prices deflated by 4.6% (Valentić, 1997). However, its social impact was hard. 
11 The three Funds established in 1997 a proper investment fund, the Croatian Pension Investment Company 
(HMID), which never evolved into a major institution.
12 Some of the biggest scandals regarding privatisation to HDZ cronies revolved around HMO. HZMO director 
Dunja Vidošević started unveiling part of the carnage that happened under her predecessors Stjepan Brčić (1990-96), 
Silvio Mićin (1996-97) and Damir Zorić (1997-99). The most glaring case concerned the highly popular newspaper 
Večernji list, while the last boutade was attempted a few days before the 2000 elections, on 29 December 1999, when 
a – later blocked – transfer of Croatia osiguranje shares, the biggest Croatian insurance company, from the Croatian 
Privatisation Fund to HMO was ordered by some unidentified HDZ official. The raison d’être was the less deman-
ding alienation procedure applied by HMO (Petrović, 2000).106
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Ad hoc indexation started with a strict limitation of available resources devoted to 
pensions and wages. In order to curb hyperinflation, the amounts allocated for pension 
benefits were to increase by 4% between October and November 1993 and by another 
4% in December. These percentages had no resemblance whatsoever to price, wage or 
GDP growth. Subsequent decrees, lasting until December 1996, consolidated this trend.13 
As crude as it may sound, spurious indexation was common practice in transition econo-
mies, and, according to Cashu (2003:4), the most effective retrenchment measure. Not-
withstanding this, the Valentić government went much further.
Approximately 160,000 beneficiaries entitled to merit pensions, who throughout their 
lifetime did not or only partially contributed towards the RFMO, were not refinanced by 
the budget. In addition, at least until mid-1996, the government tolerated contribution eva-
sion, which led to major delays during ordinary payment processes and further diminished 
the available resources (Županov, 1996:286-287). RFMO revenues experienced a 15-20% 
shortfall, and therefore the RFMO adopted an internal regulation to determine the calcu-
lation and growth of benefits. Among others, it started calculating the pension base from 
net, instead of gross wages in 1994 (Matković, 2000a).14
The end result of these measures was a drastic drop in replacement rates, see Tab. 7.
Table 7 Average net replacement ratesa
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
NRRb 75.29 62.80 63.19 61.76 52.54 45.88 45.85 47.01
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
NRRb 46.32 38.37 37.62 41.40 40.73 40.00 42.13 41.8
a The net replacement rate for old-age pensions only was much higher, its relative fall more pro-
nounced.
b Net average pension on net average wage.
Source: HZMO (2006).
The reaction by pensioner associations was almost immediate. On 27 October 1993 
they challenged the 1993 decrees before the Constitutional Court. However, the latter start-
ed examining the pensioner associations’ complaints only in July 1996, three months after 
the HSU was founded on 29 April 1996 specifically for this purpose.15 
In order to mitigate growing unease, the same Valentić government authorised in May 
1995 a symbolic 50 kuna individual supplement (Uredba o utvrđivanju mjesečnog dodatka 
uz mirovinu, NN 33/95), which, however, only marginally improved the situation.
13 The Pension and Disability Insurance Act was never actually changed, since decrees granted here more flex-
ibility in case social protests or unrest broke out.
14 In reality, what happened was a proper forging of data on wages in order to keep valorisation at the level suf-
ficient to pay out pensions (Anušić, interview), meaning that the old benefit calculation formula with generous accru-
al rates (approximately 2.2 for men and 2.5 for women per year of service) was discontinued.
15 For an overview, see http://www.hsu.hr/povijest.php [cited 26 January 2007]. 107
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“It is widely presumed that any pronounced challenge to the basic structure of the sys-
tem is equivalent to political suicide”, is a rather abused quote from Buchanan (1983:340), 
which, however, never proved as wrong as in the Croatian case. Instead of being bitterly 
punished, the HDZ triumphed at the October 1995 elections, gathering 45% of the vote 
and 59% of Sabor seats. A tentative answer will be provided.
2.2.2.3 Disarray, demobilisation, disinformation and delay
These four factors lay at the heart of pensioners’ failure to react, contrasting with 
their potential for single-issue voting, which was perceived as a major political threat in 
the rest of CEE (Guardiancich, 2004:58). Resembling Orwell’s 1984 dramatic scenario, 
Tuđman’s Croatia was incapable of acting collectively and closely resembled Claus Of-
fe’s associational wasteland.
Pensioner associations were in total disorder. In fact, the only worthwhile collective 
action was the appeal to the Constitutional Court, originally supported by the House of 
Croatian Pensioners (MUH), the Union of Croatian Pensioners (SHU), the Socialist Par-
ty (SS). Failing to be represented at parliamentary or government level in an increasingly 
authoritarian country boded disaster. However, inefficient leadership is probably to blame 
most, since SHU and MUH were too opportunistic, while the association ‘Croatian Pen-
sioner’ (DHU) lacked a sufficient number of members, founded as it was by intellectu-
als and professionals.
Moreover, Croatian civil society was sunk in apathy. The media, trade unions, minor 
political parties: none of these actors, which in Western but also some transition countries 
lend support to the retired, pointed to or capitalised on the fact that pensioners were be-
ing sacrificed to finance the defence of the country, as President Stipe Mesić stated more 
than ten years later (Ivićev Balen and Hina, 2003). However, this lack of participation may 
be ascribed to the very nature of the HDZ. This political party, mass political movement 
and national liberation front symbiosis developed a system of ‘limited pluralism’, where 
antagonist political parties existed but had their electoral rights constrained and the mass 
media were ‘free’, but obstructed by purges, control of radio frequencies, eavesdropping 
and manipulation of the press distribution agency Tisak (Grubiša, 2002:36-39). 
This prepared the stage for HDZ’s audacious bet. As hyperinflation in 1993 touched 
1617.5%, radical stabilisation was unavoidable. No government unsure of future electoral 
support would have distributed the economic burden of reforms so unevenly. In fact, lim-
iting the growth of wages would have had a much more balanced effects on both work-
ers and pensioners. Instead, at first both pensions and wages were blocked and subse-
quently only wages were allowed to grow freely. The divergence between the two was 
therefore delayed and the impact on net replacement rates was fully felt only by 1995 
(Mintas Hodak, interview). At this point, HDZ boldly justified its manoeuvrings through 
propaganda based on ethno-nationalism and asymmetric information. The pensioners’ 
strain was either denied, attributed to former Yugoslav heretic economics or lauded as 
a patriotic act.
Županov (1996:289) draws from the survey ‘Izbori 1995’ the following: 54.5% of 
pensioners deemed HDZ to be the party representing them most and 50.7% were going 
to vote for it, while the percentages for the whole sample were, respectively, 45.7% and 108
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34.1%. Thus pensioners still embodied HDZ’s main constituency, undeterred by the par-
ty’s social policy usurpations.16 Nonetheless, it has to be stressed that HDZ prepared the 
1995 election meticulously.
Military success and the opposition’s inherent weakness pushed the economic woes 
of the country to the background. In 1995, the Croatian Army led the successful campaign 
Oluja (Storm), thereby recapturing Slavonia and Krajina, and the war in Bosnia ended 
with the Dayton peace agreement. Tuđman called for elections a year early to capitalise 
on his sudden surge in popularity, and the electoral system was carefully remodelled. Out 
of 127 Sabor seats, 80 were purely proportional, 28 were attributed to županije, enlarged 
counties, 12 were reserved for émigrés and 7 for national minorities, among which there 
were only 3 for Serbs (Bartlett, 2003:46-49).
To sum up, the HDZ was at its peak in 1995, supported as it was by rekindled nation-
alist fervour. Probably, even without any tricks, an electoral defeat was simply out of the 
question. The new PM Zlatko Mateša took office on 7 November 1995. Eventually he be-
came the first to serve a full term.
2.3 Pension reforms, at last!
Post-1991 Croatia was characterised by many failed attempts at kick-starting pension 
reforms, which were otherwise perceived as unavoidable. The inherited pension system 
was duly incorporated into Croatian legislation in October 1991. The RFMO was on its 
own accord developing a parametric reform of the PAYG system – whereby contribution 
rates, benefit formulae, and other parameters are changed without any larger systemic re-
forms, as for example the introduction of funding etc. – a carbon copy of the ‘German 
point system’, which was well suited for the continental-corporatist aspirations of Croatia, 
whose prominent scholars were trained within the Bismarckian tradition. 
Bodiroga-Vukobrat (1994:334) mentions a full pension reform draft of April 1994, 
envisaging parametric reforms of old-age and new definitions in disability pensions. Not-
withstanding, the dozen or so Pension Insurance Act alternatives, presented in 1992-94 
were repeatedly dismissed. However, most concepts were retained and built upon, to be 
finally transposed into the 1998 Pension Insurance Act. 
The five-year suspension was a consequence of various factors. Government priori-
ties (stabilisation relegated all structural reforms to the background) and external circum-
stances (the raging Homeland War) characterised the period up to 1995. Once a multi-
pillar strategy was chosen in late 1995, fiscal concerns (transition costs could have been 
financed only by a more solid budgetary base, later granted by the introduction of VAT) 
and lack of expertise, remedied by World Bank’s involvement, ensured that concrete pro-
posals landed on the table only by 1997.
Thus, the second and third stages of PM Valentić’s stabilisation were discontinued as 
hyperinflation was eliminated in only one month. The falling net replacement rate conse-
quent to ad hoc indexation should have been justified by pushing a multipillar reform as 
early as 1994, but the escalation of the conflict demanded large budget transfers. 
16 The support, however, abated with respect to 1992 (62%), but this is attributable to a general trend, rather 
than to specific socio-economic factors.109
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Müller (2003:96-97) identifies the conceptual turning point in the November 1995 
international conference in Opatija, organised by the Croatian government, the East-West 
Institute and the World Bank. Following the ‘euphoric’ parliamentary elections (see par-
agraphs above), this was the inaugural appearance of the newly appointed PM Zlatko 
Mateša, who endorsed a multi-pillar reform. The focal point for economic reforms lay 
within the Ministry of Finance, headed by their fervent advocate, Borislav Škegro. How-
ever, Croatian policymakers were chiefly inspired by their Chilean émigrés17 and by the 
World Bank’s global campaign for pension privatisation. 
In contrast to other CEE countries, especially Slovenia, a counterbalancing role of the 
EU was missing in Croatia. In fact, due to the political conditionality attached to PHARE 
(later CARDS for South Eastern Europe), Croatia was included only after the end of hos-
tilities in Kosovo in 1999. The WB had by that time been already active for five years, 
starting with an US$ 128 million Emergency Reconstruction Loan in June 1994 for dam-
aged infrastructure reparation.
The initially programmed reform schedule was very optimistic. Legislation in 1996 
and two-stepped implementation in 1997: new public pillar parameters first, to restrict el-
igibility and create a solid base for second pillar contributions, starting in mid-1997. Pen-
sion system forecasting and legislative drafts were prepared using the Japanese grant. A 
WB public sector adjustment loan (PSAL) was planned, but eventually not realised. The 
semi-annual cost for a second pillar contribution rate of 10% was included into the 1997 
draft budget; however, more pressing fiscal priorities entailed an indefinite suspension of 
reforms (Anušić, O’Keefe and Madžarević-Šujster, 2003:23-24). The June 1997 presiden-
tial election, where Tuđman triumphed again,18 demanded the disbursement of scarce budg-
etary resources, while numerous postponements to the introduction of VAT (OG 47/95)
prevented Finance Minister Škegro from having a secure revenue base at disposal to cov-
er transition costs (Mintas Hodak, interview). 
As a way to deal with the prolonged crisis, the Act on the indexation of pensions (OG 
20/97) was passed in early 1997, thereby putting an end to the customary ‘rule by decree’. 
The Act amended the unresolved situation by introducing: a) a partial compensation for 
below net wage growth indexation between February 1995 and December 1996; b) indexa-
tion calculated twice a year on the 6-month average inflation from January 1997 onwards. 
Valorisation based on wage growth resumed at the margin, following the old Pension and 
Disability Insurance Act of 1983, and transfers for merit pensions were restored.
However, the Act improved neither the fiscal position of RFMO, definitely com-
promised by increasing SDR, nor the pensioners’ deteriorating situation, since it was a 
mere pretence at debt repayment and was actually insufficient to mitigate the effects of 
17 Among these, stood out former Chilean MoF Hernán Büchi – at the time of MoL Piñera, who was himself 
present at the Opatija conference – who became in the early 1990s advisor to the Croatian President, and And¸roniko 
Lukšić, one of the wealthiest Chileans and a major investor in Croatia (Anušić, interview).
18 At the time, the first cracks in HDZ’s hegemony became evident. President Tuđman abused his powers during 
the Zagreb crisis, by not confirming the appointment of the elected opposition mayor. The crisis lasted from Octo-
ber 1995 until April 1997. Furthermore, the attempt at privatising Radio 101, a staunch opposer of the HDZ regi-
me, to a conniving tycoon brought in November 1996 100 thousand protesters onto Ban Jelačić Square in the cen-
tre of Zagreb. 110
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price indexation. Thus reforms became simply inescapable, and soon after the presiden-
tial election, in September 1997, the first pillar law (the Pension Insurance Act) was sub-
mitted to the Sabor. 
Moreover, the 1997 Act also discontinued all preceding indexation-limiting decrees. 
Consequently, notwithstanding sporadic allegations of politicisation at the Constitution-
al Court level, the latter could not but interrupt the procedure initiated by pensioner asso-
ciations in 1993. The Court’s explanation was that the two norms already ceased to have 
effect (OG 48/97), and not, as the RFMO later tried to insinuate, that indexation mat-
ters prior to January 1995 were resolved. This resolution turned the press and pensioners 
against the Court and it effectively pulled the trigger for the most perverse development 
in Croatian pension reform history (see the following paragraphs).
2.3.1 Streamlining reforms through the Plenipotentiary
After the first reading of the Pension Insurance Act, reforms entered full swing. The 
public pillar law was designed as a hands-tying arrangement for the introduction of the 
funded pillar. In its final version, Art.1-2 of the Pension Insurance Act set the three-pil-
lar WB design in stone, and prescribed a (problematic) contribution rate “not lower than 
5%” for all insured younger than 40. 
In December 1997, the World Bank published Croatia Beyond Stabilization (World 
Bank, 1997), where it addressed design and fiscal issues of transition to a multipillar sys-
tem. Among others, internal financing was given top priority. Suggested public pillar 
squeezes (price indexation, formulae based on lifetime earnings, actuarially fair malus-
es, increased retirement age) would generate savings amounting to 2% GDP per annum 
by 2010.19 
The report then focused on the 2nd pillar and three options were put on the table:
a) a Chilean style reform which would however create a huge double payment problem; 
b) a gradualist approach, financed by internal savings, but prone to capture; c) a partial, 
but irreversible switch to a funded system, whose transitional cost would have been bear-
able. With it the World Bank gave Croatian politicians the right of choice, but it also made 
clear that the third option was preferred. The report envisaged a 40 cut-off age, and the 
creation of a semi-flat public pillar granting a 30% net replacement rate and a funded one 
providing another 35%. Half of the current employer and employee contribution (circa 
10% of gross wages) was initially suggested, amounting, due to the relatively low cut-
off age, to some 4-5% of total payroll in Croatia, or 2% of GDP flowing into the funded 
pillar per annum.
With respect to financing, Beyond Stabilization advised against mandatory pension 
funds (MPF) holding equity in privatised companies, especially to avoid governance and 
ownership distortions. Given the tormented history of privatisation under HDZ and polem-
ics around the issue (Zdunić, 1996), a ‘sell-off approach’ of HMO assets as opposed to a 
19 The first Pension Insurance Act draft submitted to the Sabor envisaged an equalised minimum pensionable 
age of 65. Notwithstanding the huge differences in life expectancy at retirement between men and women (8 years) 
and current European practice, the parliamentary debate led to the replacement of the proposal with the current soluti-
on, 65 for men and 60 for women (Anušić, O’Keefe, and Madžarević-Šujster, 2003:26). Given the conservative natu-
re of HDZ, this development was not surprising. 111
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‘direct conversion approach’ was preferred at least for three reasons: it increases manda-
tory pension funds’ credibility, as they have to build their portfolio from day one; it chan-
nels additional liquidity into capital markets, thereby speeding their development; it un-
freezes a congealed market, as most Croatian equity was at the time held by the Privati-
sation Fund, HMO, banks and the State.
Since the debate revolving around the three laws would not have proven easy, the 
government established a Plenipotentiary for pension reform in February 1998 (OG 27/
98). The newly introduced VAT produced a strong impact on 1998 revenues, and there-
fore reforms started to be pursued with renewed determination. The Plenipotentiary was 
independent, a firm condition imposed by Zoran Anušić, a former advisor to PM Mateša, 
who was seconded from the World Bank and who helped maintain informal Bank-govern-
ment relations at a time when these were corrupted (World Bank, 2004:iii-iv). However, 
it definitely did not depoliticise the issue. The Plenipotentiary’s coordinator was Deputy 
PM Ljerka Mintas Hodak, so neither the Ministry of Labour nor the Ministry of Finance, 
as Müller (2003: 97-98) notes, were involved. Nonetheless, its Board was basically the 
PM’s narrow cabinet. Apart from Mintas Hodak, MoF Borislav Škegro, Minister of La-
bour and Social Protection (MoL) Joso Škara and Minister for Privatisation Milan Kovač 
sat on the board, as well as Željko Potočnjak20 and Damir Ostović, aide of the Minister for 
privatisation, respectively heads of the legal and economic working groups.
The two working groups had their tasks divided. The economic group had to prepare 
draft legislation on the second and third pillars and the legal group all the accompanying 
legislation. Together they were also in charge of collaborating in the final phases of the 
Pension Insurance Act, as well as of preparing the public information campaign and ul-
timately of implementation. The two groups employed 18 people as permanent staff and 
were assigned a budget to hire external consultants.
The adoption of legislation proceeded rather swiftly, after the creation of the Plenipo-
tentiary, so that the government was accused of resorting to ‘mandatism’ (Müller, 2003: 
102), which is possibly a superficial interpretation of events. The lack of veto points per-
haps better depicts the situation.
Interest groups – trade unions, academia, the financial sector – that played key roles 
in other countries’ reforms remained silent. Opposition was chiefly voiced by pension-
er associations that were clearly concerned with marginal issues in a reform producing 
its full effects in 25 years’ time. Consequently, coalition-building played little role in the 
subsequent postponements of reforms.
Minor delays in legislation adoption were generated by external events and careful 
sequencing (the 1998 Constitutional Court’s decision, the need for a finalised Annuities 
Law), while major setbacks in implementation were chiefly connected to the 1998-99 
banking crisis and subsequent recession as well as to the HDZ’s electoral defeat following 
Tuđman’s death, and political reappointments after the SDP and HSLS took power. 
Some of these factors will be analysed in the following paragraphs, starting with the 
Constitutional Court’s populist pronouncement. 
20 Professor Potočnjak was a veteran of legislation entailing great conflict potential, as he had been involved in 
the drafting of the new Labour Code. 112
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2.3.2 Pensioners’ revenge and the Constitutional Court decision of 12 May 1998
The 1997 Court resolution (see earlier paragraphs) only rekindled pensioner asso-
ciations’ efforts. SHU, MUH, together with HSU challenged the constitutionality of the 
1997 Act on the indexation of pensions on equity and procedural grounds. A year later, 
the Court upheld the annulment of the Act almost in its entirety.21
Four and half years after PM Nikica Valentić limited overall resources to finance wag-
es and pensions to stabilise the Croatian economy (OG 91/94, 93/93), the Croatian Con-
stitutional Court annulled all but two articles of the Act on the indexation of pensions on 
the grounds that a series of temporary measures, adopted due to an unfavourable financial 
state of affairs in Croatia, had been rendered permanent, thereby causing major losses to 
current pensions and precluding compensation for prior damage.
As Anušić, O’Keefe and Madžarević-Šujster (2003:33-34) and Bejaković (2006) 
maintain, the Court based its decisions on two sets of claims. RFMO’s indexation of pen-
sions from November 1993 until December 1998 was discontinuous due to intentional 
ad hoc indexation and inadequate valorisation stemming from the transfer of insufficient 
resources to the RFMO (OG 69/98).
2.3.2.1 The court for the people
Two questions arise from this Constitutional Court decision, which had the effect of 
an earthquake on Croatian politics, the shock waves of it still being felt today.
First, on what grounds did the Court establish this right for pensioners? Two inter-
pretations exist. One is based on equity premises: the supplements granted by the gov-
ernment inadequately covered the Republican Fund of Pension Insurance deficits deriv-
ing from discontinued budget transfers. Some compensation was due. Additionally, the 
1997 Act violated the Constitution by negating rightful reparation for failed wage growth 
indexation between October 1993 and December 1996. The other interpretation is purely 
procedural (Anušić, interview) and does not alter the essence that a right for indemnifi-
cation was thereby established.
This leads directly to the second, more important question: should the Constitution-
al Court have acted in the first place? There is basic agreement between legal and eco-
nomic experts that the answer is no. At first, the Court followed a wait-and-see strategy 
through administrative silence until July 1996, probably considering the case a very risky 
one, given the economic instability of the country. Its President, Jadranko Crnić, wanted 
to present the Court as an independent body, thus some decisions were passed against the 
interests of the government. However, the 1997 Resolution rendered the Court very un-
popular overnight, since both the media and pensioner associations pointed the finger and 
accused it of politically supporting the government (Mintas Hodak, interview). In order 
to correct this ‘popular’ delegitimation, the Court probably chose the wrong subject, the 
wrong procedure and the wrong constituency.22
21 For many valuable comments on the Constitutional Court’s role in Croatian pension reforms I have to thank 
Professor Željko Potočnjak, a judge of the Constitutional Court of Croatia.
22 For this illuminating discussion I have to thank Viktor Gotovac from the Faculty of Law of the Universi-
ty of Zagreb.113
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The subject was wrong, because by definition any (unnecessary) redistribution from 
the active to the inactive population under severe financial constraints cannot even be a 
potential Pareto improvement.23 In addition, much of the money was disbursed from 2007 
onwards, 14 years after the Valentić decrees, meaning that most of these resources will be 
inherited by the same people that finance them.
The procedure was wrong, because the decision points to a strict interpretation of 
the law, rather than to a creative way of killing two birds with one stone. The Court was 
at the time filled with practitioners rather than with theoreticians and maybe the neces-
sary inventiveness was lacking. In fact, an elegant solution would have been to emulate 
the Marbury v. Madison case, the first one when the US Supreme Court acted as a judi-
cial review court. Establishing that the incriminated decrees violated pensioners’ vested 
legal rights, and that a legal remedy existed would have maintained that Croatia is a state 
based on the rule of law. Stating that the Court did not, however, have the jurisdiction or 
power to enforce that right, would not only have avoided the ensuing interminable com-
plications, but also it would have put the Constitutional Court above the rest of the judi-
ciary and relegated its action only to grandest rights and hardest cases.
Thus, it follows that the Court chose the wrong constituency to regain its legitima-
cy. By acting as a ‘popular’ court it impersonated an additional Ombudsman in opposi-
tion to the government. Whether this was due to institutional or personal disagreement 
with the government is ultimately unimportant,24 since the 1998 decision proved to be a 
Pyrrhic victory if not a real defeat. The right to compensation did not solve pensioners’ 
woes and legitimation by the people downgraded the Constitutional Court to a minor role 
within the judiciary, since appeals to it are currently and increasingly abused, even re-
garding rather trivial issues. 
2.3.2.2 Immediate effects
This ‘victory’ did not produce any tangible results for pensioners. The government 
led by PM Zlatko Mateša continued to dismiss the deriving obligations, thereby only con-
firming some disregard for the rule of law during the twilight of Tuđman’s HDZ. An in-
ternal dispute erupted. Whereas MoF Škegro was adamantly opposed to any concessions, 
lawyers, such as Deputy PM Ljerka Mintas Hodak, claimed that a judicial decision can-
not be simply ignored. Finally, under multiple pressures, the MoF gave in and PM Mateša 
acknowledged that Croatian governments during 1990-97 had not fulfilled their budget-
ary commitments towards the three HZMO predecessors. 
During the same parliamentary session when the Pension Insurance Act was leg-
islated, the Sabor passed the “small” Pension Law’ (Zakon o mirovinskom osiguranju, 
23 In fact, pensioners usually display a higher propensity to consume than wage earners, therefore such redistri-
bution only diminishes private or enterprise savings in a country starving for more investment (cf. World Bank, 1997: 
78). In addition, the HZMO stated in various occasions that a precise calculation of the pensioners’ debt would have 
taken some 7-8 months to perform. To establish these rights, the Court instead employed one single actuary (Ivan Tka-
lec) and was therefore simply unaware of the full extent of this debt.
24 A political disagreement is probably excludable, since few judges were at the time affiliated. However, HDZ’s 
governing style was resented. The government acted as it were above the law and it often interfered with the judicia-
ry, both of which probably triggered the Court’s reaction.114
I. Guardiancich: The Political Economy of Pension Reforms in Croatia 1991-2006
Financial Theory and Practice 31 (2) 96-151 (2007)
NN 102/98), which allocated HRK 7 billion for failed transfers for merit pensions and 
contribution deficits and an additional HRK 0.5 billion to cover state obligations for in-
solvent enterprises. The overall sum roughly matched pensioner associations’ calcula-
tions and was to be disbursed during the period 1998-2002 in 9 instalments to benefici-
aries who got their rights curtailed between September 1993 and June 1998, costing cir-
ca 1% of GDP per annum. 
The final result of this reparatory act was that a permanent damage to pensioners was 
dealt with sloppily. The later HZMO was delegated the task to define ways to distribute 
the promised money and it proposed a rather logical proportional distribution, but MPs 
changed it during debate. Đjuro Njavro (HDZ) put forward a more redistributive formula25 
of 100 kuna + 6% (Njavro’s supplement), which, as will be shown later, was bound to cre-
ate a major hassle as the date of its expiry, December 2002, neared.
The supposed direct impact was, however, mixed. On one hand this decision pro-
vided renewed impetus to pass the public pillar reform, but as the Croatian public and 
trade unions got distracted, on the other hand, it destabilised fiscal calculations of tran-
sition costs. The fall in net replacement rates was perceived as a window of opportunity 
for partial privatisation, and its reversal would have jeopardised the efforts already made 
(Müller, 2003:98).
2.3.3 Right sequencing
Despite various postponements, Croatian reforms were both technically and chron-
ologically impeccable. The Pension Insurance Act was adopted in July 1998, it entered 
into force in January 1999 and it opened the door for second pillar legislation. Since the 
Polish experience (the failed adoption of an Annuities Law) was looming large, as the 
Funds Act entered parliamentary procedure, MPs requested a draft law regulating annui-
ties and pension insurance companies before passing it.
This determined a delay between the first and second readings of the Funds Act and 
triggered the first postponement of contribution diversion, from January to July 2000. 
2.3.4 Interest groups’ involvement
Ljerka Mintas Hodak (interview) decries the fact that, despite the public awareness 
campaign, those most affected by reforms, i.e. younger generations, were only marginal-
ly involved in the discussion.25 The four main groups that could have been voicing their 
suggestions were trade unions, pensioner associations, the financial service industry and 
academics.
2.3.4.1 Trade unions and pensioner associations
The first two groups were characterised by extreme fragmentation and disarray. Trade 
unions were divided into hundreds of units and five registered confederations. The great-
est, the Union of Autonomous Trade Unions of Croatia (SSSH), counted only 211 thou-
sand members in 2004. Despite some incoherent opposition against partial privatisation, 
25 Some of the cited authors, Zoran Anušić and Predrag Bejaković, assert that the Croatian national team’s 3rd 
place at the 1998 FIFA World Cup is partly to blame for lack of public attention.115
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not backed by any autonomous proposal, they did not influence the reform process. This 
anomie resulted from interrelated problems: lack of knowledge26, failure to recognise the 
social and fiscal implications of pension reforms for workers, and insufficient political re-
solve for joint action (Milidrag-Šmid, interview).
The absence of inventiveness is testified by a rigid understanding of the pension 
issue as a generational competition over scarce resources, and probably even by lack of 
opportunism. On the latter point, the only trade union that planned to establish a fund-
ed pension scheme (the now incorporated HA jedan) was the Trade Union of Public 
Employees, thereby converting falling short-run membership advantages into longer-
term financial returns. The others basically overslept the Pension Insurance Act and re-
peatedly showed how changes in the Labour Code were their main, if not only concern 
(Cimeša, 2003). Trade unions were criticised for their lack of commitment by the gov-
ernment, because they did not engage in a structured debate with pensioner associations 
(Mintas Hodak, interview), as well as by the retired themselves and academics for not 
defending future workers’ rights (Kalajdžisalihović, 2003b; Matković, 2005b).
On the other hand, two structural anomalies have to be pointed out. First, the informa-
tional asymmetry was exploited in government favour, since social partnership was pos-
sibly just fictive. Trade unions claim that they were presented with close to finished draft 
laws, which did not require their approval. As a matter of fact, the predecessor of the tri-
partite Economic and Social Council was prior to 2000 inconsistently managed and dis-
played uneven results.27 It had little credibility with the public and even social partners, 
a talk-shop that accomplished nothing. Thus executive decision-making was at the time 
still perceived as the main driver of reforms, leaving very little legitimacy for social dia-
logue (Lowther and Sever, 2006). Second, it is hard to expect the government to take se-
riously a trade union, not to say a fragmented bunch, when the unemployment rate oscil-
lated between 15-20% (ILO definition).
In contrast, the Plenipotentiary’s position is on the latter two points diametrically 
opposed to that of trade unions (Anušić, personal communication), and probably the 
truth lies somewhere in between. In fact, Snježana Plevko (member of the economic 
working group), Damir Ostović and Zoran Anušić held several presentations for each 
trade union and employers’ association separately and jointly. Two additional pension 
reform sessions of the Economic and Social Council were requested by the Govern-
ment with the objective of getting a green light for the reform from all social partners 
before sending the Pension Insurance Act to the Sabor. All participants gave their full 
support: Đuro Popijać for the Croatian Employers’ Association, and Davor Jurić, Boris 
Kunst, Dragutin Lesar (SSSH), Vilim Ribić, Krešimir Sever for the trade union con-
federations.
Despite the different interpretations, the results were univocal. While trade unions 
should have had an all-encompassing interest in reforms, their inactivity was substituted 
26 Pension privatisation was at the time still a novelty, and poorly financed groups were unable to secure the 
necessary expertise on time.
27 An attempt to change things was only started after 2000, when at the request of the SDP, USAID commen-
ced the Tripartite Dialogue Project. 116
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for by the public focussing on particular issues. Puljiz (1999:14-16) defines two, both re-
lated to the public pillar. Setting the retirement age at 65 for both genders was intensely 
opposed by female MPs and women’s associations, while price indexation was the major 
concern for pensioner associations. A rather efficient neutralisation of both groups was 
achieved simply by agreeing to their demands. Therefore, the minimum pensionable age 
for women was lowered to 60 and price indexation was replaced by the ‘Croatian formu-
la’, an average of wage and price growth calculated twice a year.28 
However, nothing close to an alternative to the three-pillar structure was proposed, 
and the funded pillars were insufficiently publicly debated. 
2.3.4.2 Academics
Only a small group of scholars, including both legal experts and economists, criticised 
reforms. Among the former, Puljiz (1999:16) was particularly caustic: “There have been 
quite a few competent estimates that the second pensions reform has not been sufficient-
ly well-prepared, that it is being conducted in unfavourable economic and social condi-
tions and that, for these reasons, it will not achieve the objectives on the basis of which 
it has been inspired”. Some of these criticisms were shared by economists. Both Bakić 
(1998), a mathematician, and Škember (1998), from HZMO, claimed that the one major 
hurdle for correct implementation was the underdeveloped, unstable financial and bank-
ing systems. Notwithstanding this, they were both ‘co-opted’ into the Plenipotentiary and 
drafted reforms. The bottom-line is Milidrag-Šmid’s claim that in Croatia there was no 
social security expert à la Tine Stanovnik, coherently supporting an antagonist position 
to that of the World Bank.
2.3.4.3 Financial service industry
As for the lobbying of the financial industry before the 1999 reforms, Anušić right-
ly claims that the Croatian legislator was swift and unconditioned, which is understanda-
ble considering that, prior to 2000, asset management barely existed in Croatia. The four 
major banks entered the business alongside minor players: Zagrebačka Banka, Privredna 
banka Zagreb, Erste & Steiermärkische Bank, and Raiffeisen Bank Austria. Consequent-
ly, their involvement in the fine-tuning of the system started only once the pension fund 
industry was firmly established.
2.4 The Pension Insurance Act
The Pension Insurance Act was adopted in July 1998 and implemented in 1999. Par-
ticipation in the multipillar system was rendered mandatory for all the insured under 40 
and optional for those aged between 40 and 50. A major departure from the original draft 
was the substitution of a 10% contribution rate to the funded pillar by the formula “not 
lower than 5%”, which dissatisfied everyone but Finance Minister Škegro.
28 In the ‘Swiss formula’, valorisation follows net wage growth and only indexation is a wage-price mix. Less 
favourable valorisation followed to the ‘debate on three retired school teachers’. These would in a ‘Swiss formula’ 
world end up with different pensions. In fact, the asymmetry between indexation and valorisation grants higher bene-
fits to the one retiring earlier (Anušić, O’Keefe and Madžarević-Šujster, 2003:28).117
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The problem was of course double payment. However, the criticisms were assorted. 
Anušić proposed a gradual increase, similar to Hungary, and claimed that excessive def-
icits would have been dealt with later. The government was even aware that most of the 
contributions would have come back in the form of bonds. Notwithstanding, the MoF was 
irremovable and the unfortunate formula was retained. Not surprisingly, nomen est omen, 
the rate stayed at 5% sharp (Anušić Mintas Hodak, interview).
Apart from this one, few other political adjustments were needed. The Pension In-
surance Act represents a radical parametric retrenchment for both old-age and disability 
pensions. The pension formula underwent the most radical change. All participants have 
at least part of their pensions calculated according to a ‘German point formula’. Second 
pillar participants’ benefits are determined by a two-tier formula, the ‘basic pension’, con-
sisting of a point-based part and a flat, service-related component. 
Table 8 Reforms in the public pillar
Men Women
Retirement age 
and min pension 
qualifying period 
The min retirement age increases from 1999 on by 6 months per year, and the 
pension qualifying period decreases by 6 months per year. By 2008 the reform 
will be definitely phased in.
65 with 15 years of pension
qualifying period 
60 with 15 years of pension 
qualifying period 
Early retirement The min retirement age increases from 1999 on by 6 months per year. 
60 with 35 years of pension
qualifying period
55 with 30 years of pension 
qualifying period 
Maluses Permanent reductions for both by 0.3% for each month missing before 
reaching full retirement age.
Entitlement by
length of career
When reaching 40 (men) and 35 (women) years of pension qualifying period, 
the min retirement age is set at 55 years 6 months and 50 years 6 months 
respectively in 1999, and increased by 6 months per year until 2008.
Extended insurance 
period
Extended insurance periods were retained for certain professions and personal 
conditions, which are determined by special law. This gives the right for a 
reduction of the retirement age from 1 year every 6 when a year is counted as 
14 months up to 1 year every 3 when a year is counted as 18 months. 
Pension formula 1st pillar only 1st and 2nd pillar 
Determination Actual Pension Value (APV) x
Personal Points (PP) x
Pension Factor (PF)
APV x PP x PF
(for service in old system)
+ basic pension
(for service in new system)
+ 2nd pillar annuity
Maximum and 
minimum benefits
Min pension: 0.825% of average 1998 
gross wage per year of service
Max pension: 3.8 average personal points 
per year of service
No min or max benefits118
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Indexation and 
valorisation
APV = 50% wages + 50% prices
Pension = 50% wages + 50% prices
APV = 50% wages + 50% prices
1st pillar pension = 50% wages
+ 50% prices
Basic pension = 50% wages
+ 50% prices
2nd pillar annuity = CPI
Actual Pension
Value (APV)a
Art.175 of the Pension Insurance Act does not give a precise definition, it just 
states that it will be calculated with respect to the attained level of pensions 
realised by December 1998.
Personal Points (PP) The average of the ratio between an individual’s wage and the national 
average wage for each year of the calculation period, multiplied by total 
insured years and an initial factor that penalises early retirement. Instead 
of 10, 40 best out of total insured years will be taken into account. The 
calculation period increases from 1999 on by 3 years per annum, until 2009.
Pension Factor (PF) Depends on the type of pension.
Old-age pension and early old-age = 1.00 
Basic pension 0.25 x APV x PP x PF + 0.0025 x WAGE (98) x years of service in new system
WAGE (98) = 1998 average national wage, indexed as APV
Disability pensions Major retrenchment was achieved through the elimination of disability 
benefits based on remaining work capability and the abolition of regional 
disability commission, which were sources of widespread abuses. 
The type of disability determines the PF.
General disability No residual capacity to work = 1.00
Professional 
disability
Disability due to loss of professional capability = 0.6667 
Disability due to loss of professional capability caused by work injury = 0.5
Professional disability paid during employment = 0.3333 
Survivor pensions PF = 0.7 up to 1.00, in proportion to the number of dependent survivors
a A fierce controversy commenced after the calculation of the initial APV (Kalajdžisalihović, 2003a), 
set at HRK 35.16 in 1999 (OG, 31/99), supposedly yielding a smooth transition between pensions attained 
in December 1998 and January 1999 (Anušić, interview). For details, see the following paragraphs.
Source: Anušić, O’Keefe and Madžarević-Šujster (2003), Zakon o mirovinskom osiguranju (OG 
102/98, 162/98), Potočnjak (1999).
The prospects of having to retire according to new, more stringent rules and the con-
version of beneficiaries of temporary disability transfers based on remaining work capa-
bility into pensioners proper generated a retirement wave during 1999 (disability increased 
by 17% and old-age by 4.5%, see Tab. 4). Additionally, the minimum, service-based for-
mula was set at a relatively high level, the 0.5% accrual rate being raised to 0.825% dur-
ing the second reading of the Pension Insurance Act. Some 45% of new pensioners be-
came eligible. In particular, farmers and self-employed started earning above-poverty line 
benefits. Deplorably, the impact on the broadening of coverage was minimal (Anušić, 
O’Keefe, and Madžarević-Šujster, 2003:29-31). 119
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Even after minor restrictions to minimum pensions in 2002 (see Implementation of 
the funded pillars), the number of recipients steadily rose. By 2006 an average 0.9 pen-
sion points per year of work yielded benefits greater than the minimum only for 40 years 
of service or more. 
Table 9 Old-age pensions on 1 July 2006
Insured wage 
as % of 
average wage
Pension qualifying period
15 20 25 30 35 40 45
35 266.49 355.32 444.15 532.98 621.81 710.64 799.47
80 609.12 812.16 1,015.20 1,218.24 1,421.28 1,624.32 1,827.36
90 685.26 913.68 1,142.10 1,370.52 1,598.94 1,827.36 2,055.78
100 761.40 1,015.20 1,269.00 1,522.80 1,776.60 2,030.40 2,284.20
200 1,522.80 2,030.40 2,538.00 3,045.60 3,553.20 4,060.80 4,568.40
max pension 
380
2,893.32 3,857.76 4,822.20 5,786.64 6,751.08 7,715.52 8,679.96
min pension 738.30 984.40 1,230.50 1,476.60 1,599.65 1,722.70 1,845.75
Source: HZMO. Actual Pension Value (APV) = 50.76; min pension per year of pqp = 49.22 and 
24.61 per year >30. The amounts in grey cells are supplemented to reach the min pension.
These developments, coupled with measures enacted by the incumbent HDZ and the 
subsequent SDP governments to honour the 1998 Constitutional Court’s decision, again 
worsened, albeit only temporarily, pension-related spending. 
2.5 The Funds Act and Annuities Law
As mentioned above, the Funds Act was rendered dependent on the Annuities Law, 
and both were passed during 1999. This only marginally affected the three postponements 
of the start date for second pillar contributions (from January 2000 to January 2002), which 
were instead caused by unrelated political and economic factors, whose individual cau-
sality links are impossible to establish. 
In the political arena, the 2000 elections, the change in government and the reappoint-
ment of personnel in most agencies played a major role and altogether took over a year’s 
time. Anđelka Buneta in the Central Registry of Insured Persons (Regos), Srećko Vuković 
in HZMO and Dragan Kovačević in the Agency for Supervision of Pension Funds and In-
surance (Hagena) were all appointed because they were affiliated to the SDP (Matković, 
interview). In addition, there was an ongoing ideological clash. The old Plenipotentiary 
was disbanded in 1999 and a new one formed in early 2000, chaired by Deputy PM Željka 
Antunović (SDP), whose task was to evaluate the two laws economically and technically. 
By retaining WB official Zoran Anušić and other key actors, such as Snježana Plevko (later 
appointed deputy director of Hagena), continuity was ensured. The fact that the two laws 
had been opposed in the Sabor by the SDP was a cause for embarrassment, and Deputy 120
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PM Antunović on various occasions claimed that changes would be introduced. Howev-
er, no concrete action followed and the SDP quietly accepted the acts. In any case, it was 
plausible to foresee a deep rupture of relations with the World Bank, had the multipillar 
system been overhauled (Anušić, Mintas Hodak, interview).
 On the economic front, instead, the 1998 Small (Restitution) Law, the 1999 reces-
sion and concomitant surge in pensioners, the 2000 Pension Increase Act (see text be-
low) and the simultaneous reduction by 2% of both health care and pension insurance 
contributions (OG, 54/00) implied renewed apprehension for the coverage of transition 
costs. Under these circumstances, the two year postponement came as no surprise. Let-
ting historical details aside for later paragraphs, the technicalities of both laws were left 
untouched until implementation.
Table 10 Funded pillars characteristicsa
Affiliation Mandatory – under 40, choice of Mandatory Pension Fund by 31 March 2002
Voluntary – between 40 and 50, choice of MPF by 30 June 2002
Not allowed – over 50
Regulation of mandatory and voluntary pension funds
Legal status Neither MPF nor VPF are legal entities, they are just property with special status. 
Each has to be managed by a separate pension fund management company.
Each management company can manage one Mandatory Pension Fund, while this 
limit does not subsist for Voluntary Pension Funds.




Mandatory Pension Funds – 80,000 members by 3rd year of operations; initial 
capital HRK 40M
Voluntary Pension Funds – 2,000 members by 3rd year of operations; initial capital 
HRK 15M
Guaranteed 
Rate of return 
There is a rather low relative guaranteed rate of return, calculated by Hagena once 
a year.
Reference rate of return = actual market-share-weighted rate of return RoR – 2%
Guaranteed rate of return = Reference rate of return / 3, if > 0, Reference rate 




a) Guarantee deposit (unlimited)
b) Base capital of the MPF management company (up to 20% of stock)
c) State budget (unlimited)
The guarantee deposit amounts to HRK 1M for every 10,000 members in excess of 




There are limits by issuer and by asset class, both setting quantitative restrictions 
and investment prohibitions. The same rules apply to Mandatory Pension Funds 
and Voluntary Pension Funds. 
Among others, forbidden is all equity not traded at organised stock exchanges, 
derivatives, securities issued by persons affiliated to the fund management 
company or custodian.
The is a 50% min investment requirement for state and HNB bonds and a 15% max 
investment limit for foreign securities.121
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Administrative 
fees
Upfront (membership) fee: max 0.8% front-end fee on paid-in contributions, 
collected every month by Regos
Management fee: max 0.8% of Net Asset Value (NAV) per annum, calculated daily 
and collected monthly
Success fee: max 25% of real annual returns, calculated on first business day in 
a calendar year as 25% real change in Net Asset Value (deducted previous year’s 
consumer price index)
The Net Asset Value is calculated by the custodian bank daily and it includes the 
custody fee, while the brokerage one is borne by the fund management company.
Switching or exit fee: 5% total accumulation in 1st year, 2.5% in 2nd year, 1.25% 





Mandatory Pension Funds – EET or TEE, depending on the type of income from 
which contributions are paid. Pensions were taxed only for amounts greater than 
HRK 2,500.
Voluntary Pension Funds – Tax deduction of up to 0.8 of the basic tax deduction, 
i.e. max HRK 1,000 monthly, cumulatively for voluntary pension, health and life 
insurance.
Tax subsidy of up to 25% contributions paid, limited to HRK 5,000, that is max 
HRK 1,250 per annum.
Regulation of annuities and Pension Insurance Companies (PIC)
Legal status Pension Insurance Companies are specialised insurance companies, which can 
offer only pension-related products. 
Base capital is HRK 5M and HRK 1M is added for each 1,000 contracts.
They can charge an up-front fee of 5% of total accumulation transferred from a 
Mandatory Pension Fund to a Pension Insurance Company. A surplus in technical 
reserves exceeding 15% of future liabilities has to be distributed to annuitants.
Actuarial reserves have strict investment limits. 
Retirement age The sameas in the Pension Insurance Act for old-age, early old-age, disability and 
survivor. 
Regos transfers the MPF share to a PIC chosen by individual. 
Annuity type Mandatory Pension Funds – Lifetime price-indexed annuity, four types: single, 
single with guaranteed period, joint-and-survivor and joint-and-survivor with 
guaranteed period 
Voluntary Pension Funds – programmed withdrawals, variable annuities, and 
combinations. There are various indexation options, as well as a lump-sum payout 
capped at 30%. 
Longevity risk Mandatory Pension Fund annuities are calculated on unisex life expectancy tables, 
which entail a redistribution from men to women. Longevity risk remains high.
VPF annuities can use gender-specific tables. 
Indexation Mandatory Pension Funds – consumer price index, guaranteed by the state
Voluntary Pension Funds – consumer price index, exchange rate or mixed
a Some of these features were changed with subsequent amendments. Refer to later paragraphs. 
b EET (exempt, exempt, tax) means that contributions and investment income of reserves are exem-
pted from income tax, while benefits are taxed.
c TEE (tax, exempt, exempt) means that contributions are taxed, while investment income of reser-
ves and benefits are exempted from income tax.
Source: Anušić, O’Keefe and Madžarević-Šujster (2003), Zakon o obveznim i dobrovoljnim miro-
vinskim fondovima (OG 49/99, 106/99), Pravilnik o porezu na dohodak (54/01).122
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A number of theoretical critiques to the envisaged solutions were voiced in business 
and academia. A brief summary includes:
Legal status – One of the main imperfections was the need to establish separate man-
aging companies for mandatory and voluntary pension funds (Vlaić, interview). In such 
a small market, where there will in any case be a tendency towards agglomeration, this 
is rather burdensome.
Guaranteed Rate of Return – Despite being low, it was a considerable source of 
debate.29 The reference rate of return is weighted according to market share (capped at 
25%) and is diminished by 2% to eliminate the asymmetry around zero and reduce the 
prospects of guarantee activation. However, this only transferred the asymmetry onto the 
guaranteed rate of return. It would probably have been wiser to reduce the guaranteed rate 
of return rather than the reference rate (Bakić, 2002:442-444).
Investment limits – These were set at Draconian level (cf. Vittas, 1998:31), entailing 
the risk of running out of securities to invest in. Two peculiarities stood out. First, the re-
quired investment into state and HNB bonds was set at 50% of mandatory pension funds’ 
assets, which is unprecedented in CEE. This choice was resultant upon the worsening eco-
nomic situation of 1999. Initial calculations showed that first year’s transition cost (con-
tributions flowing into the second pillar) would amount to HRK 2.5B, while MoF Škegro 
claimed to have half that at his disposal. Thus the minimum, later overshot by all manda-
tory pension funds, was just a shielding device (Anušić, interview). Second, investment 
in derivatives was disallowed, even though the exchange rate risk might be very high in 
a country where tourism is vital (Matković, 2002b).
Administrative fees – By any standard they were set at higher than customary levels. 
Switching was basically out of the question and the Anušić (2004:5) calculated the cost-
related reductions in assets and yields as being higher than in all the countries analysed 
by Dobronogov and Murthi (2005:38).
Tax treatment – In addition to the complex Personal Income Tax Regulation (OG 54/01),
the main flaw was the failure to introduce third pillar tax exemptions for employers, which 
are crucial for the development of voluntary pension schemes.30
Pension Insurance Companies – Establishing separate institutions not yielding any 
profits for a long time was criticised by the business sector. However, the rationale be-
hind it was that pension insurance supervision be separated from the rest, thereby avoid-
ing cross-subsidisation of existing financial products (Anušić, O’Keefe and Madžarević-
Šujster, 2003:55-56).
Few of these critiques were initially addressed and new distortions were even added, 
as often happens when political considerations start to matter. Many flaws became evident 
only during implementation, which kicked off in 2002. Notwithstanding, preparations for 
the funded pillar started soon after legislation was passed, since the two agencies responsi-
ble for data collection (Regos) and fund supervision (Hagena) had yet to be established.
29 See Vittas (1998: 28-30) for general considerations on the incentive structure attached to the guaranteed rate 
of return and its eventual financing and Anušić, O’Keefe and Madžarević-Šujster (2003:41-43) for Croatia. 
30 See Zuber (2002) for a complete account.123
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2.5.1 The creation of independent agencies
A peculiar feature of Croatian pension reforms was the concomitant reorganisation of 
the revenue side of contribution collection. The latter suffered from major inefficiencies. 
Employers bore a heavy reporting burden by having to submit 20 different forms to various 
institutions, which exerted multiple controls and inspections. Administrative ineffective-
ness was fuelled by overlapping tasks and parallel networks of data compilation (HZZO, 
HZMO, Tax Administration)31, which resulted in deficiencies in transparency, accounta-
bility and ultimately overstretched public audit functions (World Bank, 2002:3-4). 
Hence, the revenue side rationalisation was for the Bank a necessary corollary to 
pension reforms. To this purpose, the 1999 Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) proposed 
and got through both a structural adjustment loan by 2002, amounting to US$ 202M and 
a pension system investment project (PSIP) worth US$ 35.6M, US$ 27.3 of which were 
WB loans (World Bank, 2004: 53). The PSIP encompassed the following actions: 
•   capacity building for Regos and Hagena, including investment in goods, consul-
tancy and training;
•   capacity building for Regos and Hagena, including investment in goods, consul-
tancy and training;
•   implementation support for public revenue and funded pension reform, compris-
ing database maintenance and operation for unified employer reporting, financing 
of Fina operational costs, technical assistance of public revenue institutional re-
form, development of the public debt market and control and enforcement func-
tions of MoF;
•   HZMO reform, increasing efficiency and effectiveness through restructuring of hu-
man resources management, training and IT;
•   financing of a Project Implementation Unit.
The Croatian government took several important steps; however, the chosen reform 
path followed a puzzling course. 
On the one hand, contribution collection was gradually incorporated into the Tax Ad-
ministration within a clear centralisation strategy. In fact, the Tax Administration started 
very gradually in 1998-99 by incorporating unemployment contributions. With the estab-
lishment of the Single Treasury Account from July 2000, it assumed the enforcement of 
pension contributions for all but the self-employed and from July 2001 it started collect-
ing all mandatory insurance contributions, taking HZMO and HZZO tasks over, including 
part of their employees. The unified control and enforcement of all payroll taxes was be-
gun by mid 2002 and on-site control of second pillar contributions in January 2003. The 
Financial Agency (Fina), successor of the in 2002 renamed Institute for Payment Transac-
tions (ZAP), continued physically to withhold contributions from employers (Bejaković, 
2004:72-73; Zakon o poreznoj upravi, NN 67/01).32
31 For valuable comments on the role of Hagena, I have to thank Mr. Toni Lukšić.
32 A byproduct of centralisation was the de facto inclusion of contributions into the budget, thereby depriving 
the tripartite HZMO boards, and hence trade unions, of any influence on the money disbursed for financing pensi-
ons (Milidrag-Šmid, interview).124
I. Guardiancich: The Political Economy of Pension Reforms in Croatia 1991-2006
Financial Theory and Practice 31 (2) 96-151 (2007)
On the other hand, decentralised supervision of pension insurance was developed by 
the World Bank as the only available choice, mainly as a consequence of other supervi-
sory agencies (HNB, Commission for securities, Authority for the supervision of insur-
ance companies and the Monitoring section of MoF) declining the possibility of taking 
on the task. Thus Hagena was established at the end of 1999 for second and third pil-
lar contributions only. Its subordination to the Sabor rendered it independent of govern-
ment. Zoran Barac was appointed director. Its main tasks, as defined in the Funds Act, 
consisted in licensing and supervising MPF, VPF and respective management compa-
nies, as well as Regos. It was also in charge of implementing most regulation connected 
with funded pillars. 
Additionally, inasmuch as Regos proved to be an extremely efficient institution, 
shaped as a central clearinghouse insulating employees from employers’ pressures and 
clearly inspired by the Swedish pension reform (World Bank, 2000:2), the establishment 
of yet another data collection agency in a small country like Croatia was perceived as in-
efficient (Anušić, interview). In fact, the plan was to broaden the tasks of this institution 
and establish them within an existing organisation. While the former eventually worked 
out, the latter did not. Regos was as well founded in late 1999 and Saša Mađarević was 
appointed director. Its mandate was considerably widened during the following three years 
(OG 114/01; 153/02) to include the collection of data on all payroll contributions, taxes 
and surtaxes. Bejaković (2004:71) provides an overview of Regos tasks. These include: 
registration of the insured to second pillar funds, cross-checking of paid-in contributions 
with reports submitted by employers, maintenance of a central database able to provide 
information to MPF and authorised institutions on every single payment.
Such an expansion of tasks was in line with the creation of a single database for all 
Croatian public bureaus; however, negotiations with agencies that owned sufficient IT 
to manage this flow of information (especially the Tax Administration) invariably failed. 
Therefore, Regos and its minuscule staff remained isolated.
These were evident signs of fierce opposition on behalf of the public administra-
tion to a major rationalisation, which would have threatened the existence of hundreds 
of overstaffed and wasteful offices. Ultimately, bureaucracy got the upper hand (see fol-
lowing paragraphs). 
2.6 HDZ’s last stand
During the second half of 1999 there were mounting premonitions that the incom-
ing electoral bout would usher a radical change into the Croatian political landscape. The 
2000 elections were the first to be disputed after the Sabor served full term, and were at 
the same time the first ones when the HDZ appeared weakened and faced a relatively unit-
ed opposition, the six-party coalition or ‘šestorka’.
The weakening of HDZ was a combination of various factors. The continuous scandals 
unveiled by the independent press regarding ‘crony capitalism’ and its failures (Bićanić 
and Franičević, 2003:16-19), the Zagreb crisis and demonstrations pushed the incumbent 
government beyond salvation. The main blow was the deteriorating health of President 
Tuđman – he had been diagnosed with cancer in 1993 – who passed away on 10 December 
1999 and whose death led to the postponement of the elections until 3 January 2000.125
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The demoralisation was such that not even the customary tinkering with electoral 
rules worked. This time, the first-past-the-post system was all but abandoned, favouring 
an entirely proportional system with a 5% threshold. The Croatian territory was divided 
into 10 gerrymandered constituencies, plus one set aside for émigrés. Ethnic Serbs were 
given a single seat. The whole campaign was uneventful, leaving in the end little doubt 
on who the winner was likely to be.
The ‘šestorka’ was a six-party coalition with the HSLS and SDP at the core, and four 
other parties, a centrist block, backing up: the Croatian Peasant Party (HSS), Istrian Dem-
ocratic Assembly (IDS), Liberal Party (LS) and Croatian People’s Party (HNS).33 
The election results were very favourable for the coalition: the SDP and HSLS got to-
gether 38.7% of the vote and the ‘šestorka’ obtained 96 out of 151 seats in the Sabor. The 
new government was formed by PM Ivica Račan (SDP) on 27 January 2000 and com-
prised ministers from all coalition partners.
2.6.1 Pensioners’ role
A major difference between the 2000 and 1995 elections was the mobilisation of pen-
sioners as a single-issue constituency, amounting to roughly ¼ of the whole electorate 
(4,177,495, of which there were 3,827,123 in Croatia and 350,372 émigrés). Alojz Mal-
ogorski, president of the House of Croatian Pensioners, repeatedly claimed that pension-
ers could be pivotal in deciding electoral results (Matković, 1999a).
The different stance of the incumbent HDZ and ‘šestorka’ was evident. Pensioners deep-
ly resented how HDZ dealt with the 1998 Constitutional Court’s decision (see page 2).
During repeated appeals of top party representatives (Mate Granić, Vladimir Šeks, 
Nikica Valentić, Milan Kovač) and in the HDZ’s electoral programme ‘Sve za Hrvatsku’ 
(All for Croatia), statistics on consumption were presented, trying to dissipate the com-
mon belief that life under socialism was better (Jureško, 1999; Matković, 1999c). Ivo 
Kujundžić, HDZ Pensioners’ Union, directly challenged the Constitutional Court’s Presi-
dent Jadranko Crnić, who claimed that HDZ did nothing for retired people during its last 
mandate (Matković, 1999f).
The response by pensioner associations was univocal. Malogorski, Ivan Nahtigal (Un-
ion of Croatian Pensioners) and Ivan Maričić (‘Croatian pensioner’ Association) signed 
a common declaration on the realisation of pensioners’ acquired rights and on the amel-
ioration of their life conditions and quality of life – the social agreement – with SDP and 
HSLS representatives and their coalition partners.34 Despite pensioner associations being 
autonomous, they opted for a political approach. In fact, they exhorted pensioners to vote 
“according to their own will’, or, alternatively, for “the signatories of the social agree-
ment” (Matković, 1999e). 
Vjesnik inquired into the reasons for not signing a similar accord with HDZ. The an-
swer was straightforward: the HDZ’s main candidate was former PM Nikica Valentić, 
33 After Tuđman’s death, in 2000, the HSLS and SDP nominated their own presidential candidate, Dražen Budi-
ša, who lost the elections against Stipe Mešić, the candidate of the other four.
34 In addition SUH was already associated with the ‘šestorka’ through the SSSH, which had already signed the 
agreement for an equitable Croatia (Matković, 1999d).126
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who devised the 1993 stabilisation package, thereby becoming the main culprit for pen-
sioners’ deteriorating social position. 
2.6.2 Honeymoon and separation
Despite the sweeping victory that marked the moral and electoral defeat of HDZ, 
which got 26.66% of the vote sliding back by almost 20 percentage points, and the un-
deniable merits of pensioners’ support (turnout was a whopping 76%), the social agree-
ment was a blessing in disguise, since it haunted the new incumbents throughout their 
entire mandate. 
The content should have warned the ‘šestorka’ of the agreement’s feasibility under 
severe fiscal constraints. The winning coalition agreed, among others, to implement the 
Constitutional Court’s decisions regarding indexation of pensions during 1993-9535 and 
indemnification for further devaluation, to decouple social assistance from pension insur-
ance, secure the timely payment of pensions before the 5th in any given month and, last 
but not least, to put the homes for the elderly back under the aegis of HZMO.
Of course, the importance attached to these requests varied, however, failed indexa-
tion between October 1993 and December 1998, rather than claims for other outstanding 
arrears, was of top priority. The timing proposed within the social agreement, albeit mo-
tivated by the fact that average pension fruition was 15 years and that soon most of the 
injured pensioners would be dead (Matković, 2000c), was unrealistic as well: the Sab-
or had six months to pass a pension debt law, while full indexation had to be achieved in 
two years’ time, starting in 2001.
The newly elected Minister of Labour and Social Welfare, Davorko Vidović (SDP), 
presented a repayment plan in June 2000, which valued the outstanding debt at HRK 22.7 
billion cumulatively over the period 2001-2010. While only harmonisation of different cal-
culation bases was covered, it was a realistic plan, given existing budget restrictions. The 
final version, the Pension Increase Act (OG 127/00), relied on cash transfers, earmarking 
some 2.15 billion kuna per year, and tried to squeeze relative pension increases into the 
figure. Benefit raises were between 20% and 0.5%, depending on the year of retirement 
and reference salary, while the Pension increase act took effect from January 2001.
The first proposals were greeted relatively warmly by pensioners, however, they were 
regarded as partial solutions, falling short of expectations, i.e. consistent wage indexa-
tion for the missing years.36 Thus, after stalling, the situation went downhill. There was a 
number of unresolved problems that pensioner associations and some coalition partners 
(IDS in primis) blamed the government for.
Despite the effective increase in NRR during 2001 (see Tab. 7), these were average 
rates to avoid calculation for each individual pensioner. Lower pensions entitled to a ‘safe-
guard supplement’, as an effect of the increase, either lost this right and effectively expe-
35 Pensioner associations requested compensation for failed pre-indexation during 1991-92 as well. The working 
group within the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, however, ruled it out (Matković, 2000b).
36 Fulfilling such demands would have cost the state HRK 140-210 billion over 10 years, that is between
92-138% of Croatian GDP in 2000 (calculations vary).127
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rienced lower raises or retained it and did not register any change. The same happened to 
those receiving a minimum pension due to insufficient contributions (Matković, 2000d).
Not unexpectedly, pensioner associations were dissatisfied. In addition to the positive 
nature of the dispute, there was a normative one. Art.1 of the Pension Increase Act directly 
addressed the fulfilment of the 1998 Constitutional Court’s decision, which was deemed 
unacceptable. Their appeals were swiftly turned down by the same Court (NN 03/02).
2.7 ‘Decisive… perhaps’
This unforgiving phrase was used to describe both PM Račan’s governments. The 
second one was constituted in July 2002, after the HSLS broke away from the coalition. 
Račan was a reformist, but could not rein in the factional ‘šestorka’. The main disagree-
ments with Dražen Budiša, leader of HSLS, broke out on the ICTY indictments against 
Croat Army generals and on the co-ownership of the Slovenian nuclear plant in Krško, 
which ultimately tore the coalition apart. 
In pension affairs, SDP never found a balance between populism and fiscal austerity. 
A sequence of contradictory acts characterised the ‘petorka’ period37, the ones clamping 
down on interest groups overshadowed by those disbursing favours.
SDP gave in to a series of demands, which effectively set in motion the populist de-
cay that followed the rebirth of HDZ under PM Ivo Sanader. After fulfilling some pen-
sioners’ requests, Račan surrendered to both his own parliament and to the nascent pen-
sion fund lobby. However, the rising problem concerning new pensioners’ falling net re-
placement rate was ignored and even aggravated, for obvious fiscal reasons. Pensioner 
associations again felt disenfranchised and turned away from what was left of the cen-
tre-left government. 
SDP’s well-intentioned future reform plans, the strategy for the development of the 
Republic of Croatia: ‘Croatia in the 21st century’ (NN 97/03), remained lettre morte.
2.7.1 All pensioners are equal, but some pensioners are more equal than others…
As mentioned above, SDP governments dealt with merit pensions very inconsistent-
ly. This elicited major rancour by ordinary pensioners, who deemed them emblematic of 
HDZ policymaking and in dire need of reorganisation. 
On the one hand, measures were issued limiting maximum pensions for MPs and vet-
erans to twice the maximum ordinary pension (NN 82/01) and directly diminishing ben-
efits for privileged categories by variable amounts ranging from 8 to 20%.38 In addition, 
the SDP tried to deprive the combatant status of its overestimated dignity and to monitor 
regional committees responsible for assigning privileges, operating under the Ministry for 
Homeland War Combatants (Puljiz, interview), however, the precarious balance between 
international demands (collaboration with ICTY) and domestic political stability, proba-
bly prevented more radical moves.
37 From July 2002 until December 2003, a five-party coalition governed and HSS became SDP’s main coali-
tion partner. 
38 This implied the amendment of the Pension Insurance Act and various special laws.128
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On the other hand, earlier during the period of office, eligibility of MPs to benefits 
was rendered even laxer.39 This created an overwhelming chorus of disapproval (Goreško, 
2000). Even HDZ had been aware that the Sabor should not unnecessarily play with this 
issue. Appeals to the Constitutional Court followed, but the latter found no infringement 
of the Constitution when the government grants certain privileges and is prepared to pay 
for them (via the budget). 
2.7.2 The deepening cleavage
Another blow to those retiring under the Pension Insurance Act was a further tight-
ening of eligibility criteria.
Public opinion was shocked to learn that the SDP curtailed minimum pensions. Cuts were 
far from radical, however, the accrual rate for each pension qualifying year above 30 was 
halved from 0.825% to 0.4125% and maluses for early retirement were increased to 0.34% 
per month, totalling 4.08% per annum, up to a maximum permanent decrement of 20.4%.
At the same time, following a dispute with pensioner associations over the prolon-
gation of the 100 kuna + 6% supplement, granted in 1998 by the HDZ, the government 
gave in. The supplement was maintained, but not entered into the calculation base or in-
cluded for indexation (OG 147/02). 
Ultimately, the consequences were rather inauspicious. The social security system 
was turned into a lottery in the eyes of the public, due to swift implementation of stricter 
conditions and the progressive elongation of the calculation period (Goreško, 2000). In 
addition, retaining supplements strengthened the basis for later demands for equalisation 
of ‘old’ and ‘new’ pensions. 
2.8 Implementation of the funded pillars
Fervid legislative production regarding contribution rates preceded implementation of 
the funds law. After the rates were diminished by 2% in 2000, the system was fine-tuned 
in December 2002 (OG 147/02). Minimum and maximum contribution bases were estab-
lished, amounting respectively to 35% and 600% of the average wage. The upper limit 
rendered the system symmetrical, since the maximum pension amount (3.8 pension points 
per year) elicited much contribution evasion. In addition, contributions were fixed at 20% 
– 15% to the first and 5% to the second pillar – and entirely charged to employees.40 
In order to minimise further delays, the temporary licensing of mandatory pension 
funds and related management companies started in October 2001.41 By mid-November, 
39 Serving half a term, an MP can retire at 55 (men) or 50 (women) and 20 years of pension qualifying period; 
serving three terms (at least two years in each), 15 years of pension qualifying period. The minimum pension cannot 
be lower than 65% of the last salary, thus twice the maximum ordinary benefits (NN 55/00). 
40 This change was probably dictated by the boundedly rational perception of contributions by employees. Even 
though the fiscal result does not change, employees’ awareness potentially increases when they are directly faced with 
the whole contributory burden.
41 There were delays with the licensing of custodian banks, as conflict of interest legislation was very restricti-
ve, since no affiliation with MPF managing companies was allowed. HVB Croatia, Hypo Alpe Adria Bank and Hrvat-
ska Poštanska Banka were ultimately licensed. 129
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registration of members commenced. Contributions were planned to start in January 2002. 
Regos outsourced registration operations to branch offices around the country belonging 
to ZAP (later Financial Agency). 
The insured below 40 were given time until 31 March to choose a mandatory pension 
fund and those failing to do so were randomly redistributed by Regos to the funds accord-
ing to market share. The correspondent contributions were ‘parked’ into an account of the 
National Bank of Croatia and earned the HNB discount rate of 5.9%. The selection peri-
od for affiliates aged between 40 and 50 lasted until 30 June.
In order to raise rather low public awareness, a major education campaign was 
launched by Croatian pension reform institutions, financed by USAID and implemented 
by Carana Corporation. It was an undeniable success. In the last months of 2001 public 
awareness grew from 32% to 81%, while 82% of the surveyed entirely or mostly support-
ed reforms and over 88% chose their own MPF, instead of being allocated to one by Re-
gos (Hurd, 2003:5). As Anušić, O’Keefe and Madžarević-Šujster (2003:37) point out, the 
campaign first focused on the functioning and promotion of the second pillar, and from 
November 2001, on registration procedures. 
The final results were, however, mixed. By July 2002, the seven licensed mandato-
ry pension funds counted 837,237 new members, of which 721,177 were under 40 and 
116,060 aged between 40 and 50 (Androić, 2002). The latter figure represented a failure: 
instead of a 50% affiliation rate for this age group, less than 1/3 registered. This result 
was probably determined by two factors: a) distrust by Croats following major financial 
crises; and b) on-line programs, such as those provided by Hagena, showing that multi-
pillar pensions yielded lower benefits than public pillar ones.
2.8.1 The marketing campaign
Notwithstanding an expensive marketing campaign – HRK 120 million, or 32% of 
total charter capital of the industry – the excesses seen in Poland42 were not repeated and 
violations were rare. Stringent marketing rules (Chłoń-Domińczak, 2003:33-34), coupled 
with privacy of fund selection and Croatian conservatism, implied that direct marketing 
had almost no correlation with resulting membership (Anušić, O’Keefe and Madžarević-
Šujster, 2003:59-60). 
The brands of banks involved in the management of pension funds (see next para-
graph) were the most important factor affecting choice. Zagrebačka banka, Raiffeisen 
Bank and Privredna banka Zagreb (PBZ) instantly attracted almost 90% of all members, 
raising widespread oligopoly concerns. 
As the market structure consolidated in the following years, these worries appeared 
increasingly well-founded and were definitely fuelled by the indifference displayed at gov-
ernmental level. Further amendments to legislation only worsened the problem.
42 With respect to the legislative process, Croatia, Poland and Romania reformed pensions almost simultaneou-
sly at the end of the 1990s. Subsequently, Poles were the fastest to implement, followed by Croats, while at the time 
of writing, Romania is still struggling. Learning effects should not, therefore, be ruled out.130
I. Guardiancich: The Political Economy of Pension Reforms in Croatia 1991-2006
Financial Theory and Practice 31 (2) 96-151 (2007)
2.8.2 Evolution of the market
By January 2002, Hagena licensed seven mandatory pension funds and relative man-
agement companies. Of these AZ, PBZ/CO and Raiffeisen very soon attained the 80,000 
member minimum threshold, while Erste, Plavi, Helios and Ha-jedan did not. 
As a consequence of financial scandals, Erste banka bought Riječka banka, one of 
the co-owners of Plavi MPF. Since having stakes in two MPF was not allowed, Hagena 
approved the merger of Erste, Plavi and Helios into the Erste Plavi fund (Matković, 20-
03b). Ha-jedan, the MPF established by the Trade Union of Public Employees, among 
others, was outclassed by competitors as it managed to attract only 0.35% of total mem-
bers, despite its marketing expenditures being greater than the annual contribution in-
flow. After considering conversion into a VPF, Hagena authorised its takeover by A-Z 
(Hina, 2003). Since then, the Croatian mandatory pension fund market became almost 
consolidated: four mandatory pension funds survived and the situation remained un-
changed as of 2007.
Table 11 Ownership structure of Croatian Mandatory Pension Funds 
Name Managing 
company






AZ Allianz  ZB 
d.o.o. 





Erste Plavi  Erste, d.o.o.  TBIH Financial Services 
Group NV (Netherlands)
29.00 Istarska kreditna 
banka, d.d. 
2.47
Erste Bank der 
Öesterreichischen 
Sparkassen AG (Austria)




Steiermärkische Bank und 
Sparkassen AG (Austria)
12.05
EBRD (UK)  10.06



















a Croatian branches of foreign companies are included among domestic owners.
The following tables present membership, contributions, returns on 31 December 
2005 and relative flows during the year. 131
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Table 12 Membership, contributions and returns in 2005
AZ Erste Plavi PBZ/CO Raiffeisen Total
Members 31 Dec 2004 462,291 126,768 194,494 380,091 1.163,644
First registration 3,082 1,373 3,338 3,396 11,189
Additional registration 1,984 635 2,001 1,803 6,423
Regos allocation 27,772 7,730 11,836 22,931 70,269
New members total 32,838 9,738 17,175 28,130 87,881
Switches from other 
mandatory pension funds
772 4,939 2,685 3,152 11,548
Switches to other 
mandatory pension funds 
5,230 1,369 1,765 3,184 11,548
Net change - 4,458 3,570 920 - 32 –
Membership termination 892 317 573 808 2,590
Members 31 Dec 2005 489,779 139,759 212,016 407,381 1,248,935
Membership share in % 39.2 11.2 17.0 32.6 100
Net contributionsa 1.306,286 307,675 531,811 964,515 3.110,287
Transfers from other 
mandatory pension funds 
3,119 28,597 15,006 18,317 65,038
Transfers to other 
mandatory pension funds
31,010 8,077 9,518 17,049 65,653
Corrective payments 925 174 230 663 1.991
Termination payments 7,104 2,232 5,173 6,140 20,650
Gross rate of return in % 7.69 8.62 8.12 9.19 8.34
Calculation unit
31 Dec 2004
124.01 125.40 127.17 126.14 125.35
Calculation unit
31 Dec 2005
131.28 135.49 133.22 138.12 134.20
a All amounts are expressed in thousands kuna.
Source: HANFA (2006: 106-108).
Table 12 shows a clear cleavage between the two bigger funds (AZ and Raiffeisen) 
and the smaller ones (Erste Plavi and PBZ/CO). This imbalance is probably responsible 
for suboptimal effectiveness of the pension fund lobby and a tendency for oligopolisation 
in the market. However, performance of the funds was rather satisfactory and artificially 
boosted by government bonds yielding favourable returns. In fact, portfolio investments 
are heavily imbalanced and render the 50% minimum investment into treasury bonds re-
quirement redundant, see Tab. 13.132
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Table 13 Overall portfolio structure (in thousands kuna and %)
Asset class 31 Dec 2004 31 Dec 2005
Amount Share in % Amount Share in %
Domestic assets 7.498,547 92.75 10.673,953 89.01
Securities and deposits 7.174,461 88.74 10.294,567 85.85
shares + global depositary receipts 279,148 3.45 333,484 2.78
government bonds 6.210,223 76.82 8.709,190 72.63
municipal bonds 66,697 0.83 60,016 0.50
corporate bonds 521,763 6.45 442,878 3.69
closed investment funds 0 0.00 0 0.00
open investment funds 0 0.00 258,985 2.16
short-term securities 59,953 0.74 163,563 1.36
deposits 36,676 0.45 326,450 2.72
Cash 221,129 2.74 148,781 1.24
Credits 102,957 1.27 230,604 1.92
Foreign assets 585,955 7.25 1.318,030 10.99
Shares 62,982 0.78 134,902 1.12
Government bonds 41,257 0.51 208,561 1.74
Municipal bonds 0 0.00 0 0.00
Corporate bonds 57,855 0.72 52,765 0.44
Closed investment funds 0 0.00 0 0.00
Open investment funds 423,862 5.24 921,801 7.69
Short-term securities 0 0.00 0 0.00
Deposits 0 0.00 0 0.00
Total assets 8.084,502 100.00 11.991,983 100.00
Net assets 7.913,238 11.714,215
Source: HANFA (2006: 107).
Various deficiencies in the laws governing the third pillar (lack of incentives for 
employers) and maybe low public awareness prevented the voluntary funds from tak-
ing off. By the end of 2005 there were six open-end and five closed-end voluntary pen-
sion funds on the Croatian market. Open-end voluntary funds showed promising devel-
opments as membership rose by 70% to 51,158. Closed-end voluntary funds totalled 
only 5,336 affiliates.
2.8.3 The iron law of oligarchy
As soon as implementation started, various incongruities in the Funds Law emerged. 
In order to lobby the government and especially the regulator, Hagena, the MPF man-
agement companies very early established the ‘Association of Croatian Pension Funds 
Management Companies and Pension Insurance Companies’ at the Croatian Chamber of 133
I. Guardiancich: The Political Economy of Pension Reforms in Croatia 1991-2006
Financial Theory and Practice 31 (2) 96-151 (2007)
the Economy and put in place an annual presidency rotating system. The Association be-
came also a member of the European Federation for Retirement Provision, which, how-
ever, bore little importance for the group due to the focus of EFRP on the application of 
the IORP directive. The latter in fact affects only occupational schemes, which still play 
a negligible role in Croatia (Vlaić, interview). 
During nearly weekly appeals on the press, the presidents of MPF management com-
panies, individually or through the Association, outlined some of the issues in need of im-
provement. Their requests mainly focused on the broadening of investment into derivatives 
(even just futures), foreign securities and equity traded on less regulated markets.43
Practically, the lobby, despite its carefully planned organisation did not prove ex-
tremely successful. Less than half of its demands were fulfilled; however, the SDP in-
troduced a significant revision of administrative fees and various requirements in June 
2003, just before the elections (Zakon o izmjenama i dopunama Zakona o mirovinskom 
osiguranju, NN 103/03).
Table 14 Second pillar adjustments
Licensing Mandatory pension funds – 50,000 members by 3rd year of operations
Voluntary pension funds – 200 members by 3rd year of operations
Switching 0.8% total accumulation in 1st year, 0.4% in 2nd year and 0.2% in 3rd.
Success fee Repealed.
Management fee max 1.2% of net asset value per annum
Guarantee deposit HRK 1M for every 10,000 members in excess of the 50,000
minimum affiliation
Source: NN 103/03.
Thus, licensing requirements were relaxed, the excessive switching fee drastically re-
duced and the success fee repealed. However, as a compensation, probably also for failed 
increase in contribution diversion, the management fee was increased to 1.2% of NAV, 
which is the world record (Anušić, interview). 
At first glance the situation seems under control, and yet, in a Rumsfeldian world of 
known unknowns, the devil lies in the detail. This amendment to the Funds Law only ex-
acerbated the furtive oligopolisation of the system and exasperated the cleavage between 
bigger and smaller mandatory pension funds. The process is a subtle version of policy drift 
(Hacker, 2005). Five factors constitute the mechanism (Vlaić, interview):
•   given the small Croatian market, membership requirements (even 50,000) effective-
ly represent an insuperable barrier to entry;44
43 Only first quotation was allowed, while public joint-stock companies (JDD), which have only marginally lower 
trading standards, were excluded. By 2007 there were just seven companies listed on first quotation, six on the Zagreb 
stock exchange and one in Varaždin. For details, see http://www.crosec.hr/registri.asp [cited 17 March 2007].
44 In 2006, there were rumours of further relaxation of mandatory membership requirements. 134
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•   registration through Fina branch offices is useful, but due to Croatian geography (there 
are more than 1,000 islands), it is suboptimal as many potential switchers are deterred. 
Tab. 12 shows how the few members that switched funds moved to the MPF where re-
turns were highest, i.e. Erste Plavi and Raiffeisen in 2005 (Matković, 2006d);46
•   new members who fail to select an MPF are automatically assigned by Regos to funds ac-
cording to their market share. This crystallises the initial situation, and pushes the MPF 
management into apathy, since success- or merit-based competition is emasculated;
•   the successful education campaign was discontinued after 2002, meaning that new 
participants are poorly informed and hence very few (roughly 1/5) choose a MPF, 
thereby worsening the problem above; 
•   the change in the fee structure further weakens the incentives for good manage-
ment, as larger funds make fat returns by cashing in the increased management fee. 
In smaller funds, return on equity (ROE) fell to around 10%, a very low figure bare-
ly securing survival.
These determine a rupture in the lobby’s unity, since the smaller funds develop con-
siderably different interests than the bigger ones. The prospects are rather bleak, as com-
petition may be completely annulled via aggressive marketing by larger funds. However, 
the projected change in the redistribution formula may unleash even more aggressive mar-
keting strategies, if larger funds’ share falls (Latković, interview). In a market consisting 
of only four funds, any further concentration will imply a failure of World Bank policies, 
making the privatisation of the pension system simply too costly in its redundancy.
2.9 The 2003 election
During 2003, the incumbent SDP and what was left of its crumbling coalition found 
themselves, with respect to pensioners, in a position roughly similar to that of the HDZ 
in 1999. Of course few of the scandals and abuses that characterised the previous govern-
ment were replicated, however, PM Račan and especially MoL Vidović had to stand up 
for their accomplishments, which were though in an indefensible position.
In fact, pensioner associations’ leitmotiv was that neither the previous, nor the cur-
rent government extinguished their debts: the HDZ by negating the Constitutional Court’s 
1998 decision and SDP by not fulfilling the 1999 pre-electoral agreement. The incum-
bents’ assertions that they repaid each pensioner some 7.6 out of 24 pensions making up 
the debt created by HDZ sounded absurd (Hina, 2003), given the appalling levels of pov-
erty among the elderly.
At first, MUH and SHU intended to retry the pre-electoral agreement card by sending 
their requests to all passable coalitions (Matković, 2003a); however, after being courted by 
most parties with all sorts of promises, they decided to run unitedly and independently. If 
successful, they would become the first socially homogeneous interest group represented at 
parliamentary level in Croatia. A common declaration signed by most pensioner associations 
delegated representation to Vladimir Jordan’s HSU, which presented candidates in each of 
the 11 districts (Matković, 2003c). Among these figured association leaders such as Ivan 
Nahtigal and Vladimir Lokmer. HSU presented its quixotic programme in November. 
45 On the other hand, Latin American excesses are avoided.135
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The elections held on 23 November 2003 witnessed a convincing, but not overwhelming 
victory by HDZ. Nonetheless, the main surprise were the three seats obtained by HSU, which 
fell short of the 5% threshold by a few hundred votes in another three districts. HDZ obtained 
66 seats (62 at home and 4 from émigrés) and needed another 11 to have a majority in the Sa-
bor. Three out of those 11 votes got to be known as the dearest in Croatian history.
2.9.1 Post-electoral horse trading
The pressure exerted by three HSU MPs on the HDZ was nothing short of blackmail-
ing. Two factors accounted for this course of events. On the one hand, the mere fact that 
HDZ needed HSU votes was entirely fortuitous, and on the other, once this trend was 
established, there was no coming back: unless pensioners’ requests were fulfilled, HSU 
would have probably gained in strength at each subsequent election.
Ivo Sanader’s main problem became finding a suitable coalition partner, because each of 
the three plausible options became suddenly unavailable. The HSLS-DC coalition underwent 
a major defeat and was thus out of the game. The Croatian Party of Right (HSP) was not ac-
ceptable in light of the EU accession process due to its radical right status. The HSS was just 
about right, but when its president Zlatko Tomčić proposed the deal, the party almost split 
up. Thus, after co-opting a few defectors and representatives of national minorities, Sanader 
signed an agreement of support with pensioner representatives (Latinović, 2003). 
2.10 Sanader’s government and institutional degeneration
Very soon, the newly elected HDZ government showed its populist face, despite prov-
ing a strong advocate of EU membership and capable of compromise on thorny Homeland 
War-related issues (Fisher, 2006:195-196).47 In fact, the cadeaux promised to other coa-
lition partners and external supporters (HSS, HSP etc.) paled in comparison to the HDZ-
HSU agreement. The three votes for the election of PM Sanader’s minority government 
on 23 December 2003 entailed:
Table 15 The HDZ-HSU agreement 
Within the first 100 
days of government
resumption of wage growth indexation
inclusion into the pension base of the 100 kuna + 6% supplement
Until 30 June 2004
submission of a law settling the obligations deriving from the 1998 
Constitutional Court’s decision
submission of a law providing for additional yearly indexation
to GDP growth until NRR reaches 70% (intermediate objective 50%
by January 2005)
During 2004
amendments to the Pension Insurance Act to improve retirement 
conditions of pensioners not falling under the funded pillar
redefinition of the membership of the HZMO Board
total exclusion of persons older than 65 from medical
and medicine expenses
Source: HSU, 2003.
46 However, threats of further postponements of EU accession negotiation played a major role here.136
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Probably, not even dedicating the whole parliamentary agenda would have been suf-
ficient to meet all these demands. 
2.10.1 Grey lobby
From the formation of PM Sanader’s government in December 2003, until the local 
elections of May 2005, when HDZ managed to secure votes by HSP and de facto breach 
the agreement with the Croatian Pensioners Party with impunity (Matković, 2005b), the 
public pillar got captured by pensioner associations.
The sequel of fulfilled demands started with great fanfare in February 2004, when a 
common pensioners-government committee was established by HSU leader Vladimir Jor-
dan and Sanader’s inner cabinet, comprising deputy PM Jadranka Kosor and Andrija He-
brang, and the Ministry for the Economy, Labour and Entrepreneurship Branko Vukelić 
(Matković, 2004a). The committee produced a major amendment to the Pension Insur-
ance Act already by March 2004 (OG 30/04), thereby resuming wage-based indexation, 
including the 100 kuna + 6% supplement into the pension base and redesigning the HZMO 
Board.48 Additionally, the Personal Income Tax Act was amended and the tax exemption 
for pensions was raised from 2,550 to 3,000 kuna. Health care contribution exemptions 
were broadened as well (Matković, 2004b).
These concessions marked the peak in government-pensioner associations relations, 
which afterwards witnessed a rapid deterioration, due to the fiscal impossibility of financ-
ing their excessive demands. Interestingly, the pivotal role in the debate that took place 
around the restitution of the debt and the other points of the Agreement was played by 
the IMF. Both Dimitri Demekas, the South-eastern Europe Division chief, and Athana-
sios Vamvakidis, the IMF permanent representative to Croatia, repeatedly pointed out 
that while the pensioner debt constituted a vested right due to the Constitutional Court’s 
decision, wage indexation was purely political and, of course, unsustainable (Matko-
vić, 2004c).
The US$ 141 million stand-by arrangement signed in August 2004 weighed heavily 
on PM Sanader’s future choices. Expectedly, the additional, yearly indexation to GDP was 
not even contemplated and, in July 2005, indexation based on the ‘Croatian formula’ was 
put back into place (OG 92/05). The HSU was very disappointed, however, it did not ter-
minate collaboration with HZD. In fact, talks on the restitution of the pensioner debt were 
still underway and the ‘new’ versus ‘old’ pensioner affair was only starting to swell up.
2.10.1.1 An imaginative solution
The first step towards the assessment of the pensioner debt was the Pensioner Fund 
Act of July 2005 (OG 93/05), which established a pensioner fund to be filled by state as-
sets and budget transfers with the exclusive aim of carrying out the 1998 Constitution-
al Court decision. The fund was to be managed by HPB Invest. The rest of the year was 
spent debating on how to render repayment effective. 
47 The original Pension Insurance Act foresaw 7 members appointed by the government and 2 each by pensi-
oner, insured and employer associations. The new amendment, instead assigned 4 members to the government and 
3 to each association.137
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In November 2005 PM Sanader proposed the following solution: a) a swift repay-
ment in four instalments over two years (from June 2006 until December 2007) of half 
of the entire amount; b) a slower reimbursement in six yearly instalments from 2007 un-
til 2012 of the whole amount. Of the 426,309 out of 677,411 pensioners who became el-
igible, 74% chose the swift method and 26% the slower one. The latter figure was much 
higher than what the government hoped for – less than 5% - and raised the pensioner debt 
bill from HRK 8 billion up to HRK 13.8 billion (HZMO, 2007). The IMF did not endorse 
the manoeuvre, since the amounts needed for the first instalment, if not realised through 
privatisation revenues, may have destabilised public finances, thereby creating larger than 
expected budget deficits (Bejaković, 2006).
The end of the pensioner debt saga was written in 2007, when the government, after 
major protests by HSU and various pensioner associations, gave in to the reimbursement 
of the debt incurred for survivor and maximum pensions, which were previously excluded. 
This added another HRK 1.4 billion to the pensioner debt bill, to be paid to 43,781 benefi-
ciaries (3,093 of whom were receiving maximum pensions until 31 December 1998).
2.10.1.2 ‘New’ versus ‘old’ pensioners
The main reason the HSU did not cease to cooperate with the HDZ, despite its not be-
ing anymore vital for the coalition is the unresolved issue of the falling purchasing pow-
er of ‘new’ pensioners.
At the heart of the problem lies the initial computation of the APV to guarantee con-
tinuity between pensions calculated according to the old and new formulas, which was 
used as an obfuscation element to pass the Pension Insurance Act. Milidrag Šmid (inter-
view) claims that APV was determined in line with the 1998 niveau of average pensions, 
not including supplements. To do this and comply with ILO Convention 102 (a 40% mini-
mum NRR with respect to net wages qualified male workers), average wages in construc-
tion work, which was, like textiles in dire straits in 1998, were used.
A quick comparison of Tab. 9 and Tab. 16, shows that the gap between ‘old’ and ‘new’ 
pensioners is deteriorating fast: while in 2002 some 26% of new pensioners were granted 
the minimum pension supplement, this figure rose to 67% by 2005 (Matković, 2006b). In-
terpretations of the causes, however, differ, or better, are complementary. The World Bank 
argues that supplements make for much of the difference, while the ‘grey lobby’ claims that 
the increasingly stringent formula (longer calculation period etc.) is fully responsible.
Table 16 Insured in both pillars, with respect to pension base
Yearly 
averages
Pension base Total number 
of insured X ≤ min
base
min base < X
≤ average wage




2005 52,171 692,055 389,875 3,102 1,137,201
2006 40,641 705,566 410,438 3,472 1,160,171
Source: HZMO. The min pension base is 35% of the average wage and the max base is 600% of the 
average wage. The total number of insured is lower than that reported by pension funds, because here 
only those insured who effectively paid in contributions during reference periods are counted.138
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Whichever the case, the result is that the ‘grey lobby’ reunited in the attempt to cor-
rect this downward trend, by proposing a whole series of correctives: shorter calculation 
period, ad hoc increases, new computation of the APV and a higher minimum pension – 
for example equal to 40% of the average wage (SSSH, 2006). It is interesting to note that 
Piersonian obfuscation and division tactics may virtually exclude an interest group from 
a deliberative arena, just to render it stronger in the following one, as Orenstein would 
have it. In this case, previously divided and uninterested trade unions united forces in the 
pursuance of ‘new’ pensioner interests. 
The salience of perceived inequality between the two cohorts gained in prominence 
as the electoral year 2007 approached. In May 2006, HSS had already sent to parliament 
an amendment to the Pension Insurance Act rectifying the situation. Theatrically, PM Sa-
nader’s government fully endorsed the issue only months later, and by October 2006 a 
new working group was established. The SDP followed suit in November, when it pre-
sented its own proposal. The details of a renewed pension reform, which would hinge on 
the use of increased budget revenues (estimated to be rising at an incredible 12% per an-
num) to bridge the gap between ‘new’ and ‘old’ pensions – by for example setting up an 
investment fund – were not spelled out; however, social partners and pensioner associa-
tions were invited to join a public debate (Lipovac and Oruč Ivoš, 2006). As Anušić put 
it, if such a reform passed, and it will, the chances of increasing contributions to the sec-
ond pillar will probably disappear.
A less debated, but equally worrisome corollary to this populist surge is the not yet 
quantified multiplication of Homeland War combatants granted disability status, often 
as a result of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Almost half a million relatively 
young men, entitled to very high benefits, could in a few years suck public finances dry 
and the blame should, according to Professor Puljiz (interview) be laid entirely at the 
door of the HDZ.
2.10.2 Pension funds’ lobby
Despite its fairly smooth organisation, mandatory pension funds did not engage in 
any major lobbying campaign involving its two main targets: the regulator Hanfa and the 
Ministry of Economy, Labour and Entrepreneurship for new legislation. One of the main 
reasons may be the institutionalisation of its role, as mandatory pension fund representa-
tives are present in most working groups dealing with the issue. The final result is, how-
ever, that their most pressing demands are not being fully considered, because their de-
mands were politically too sensitive. There was a discrepancy between the salience of 
the 3 mentioned issues (higher contributions, short accumulation and downside risk) and 
what was being discussed instead (investment limits, fee structure).
The attention of the media is focused on investment limits and the fee structure, how-
ever, these are probably minor problems burdening the Croatian second pillar and they are 
being slowly addressed. In fact, Hanfa is gradually reducing the compensation granted to 
mandatory pension funds for the elimination of the success fee by diminishing the man-
agement fee from 1.2% of the net asset value to 0.95%. In addition, the relaxation of in-
vestment limits (access to JDD, foreign markets, and derivatives, as well as higher single 
issuer limits) is slowly entering the agenda. The special law allowing for the allocation 139
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of part of privatised INA shares to mandatory pension funds (Valentić, 2006) is opening 
precious political negotiation space.
Latković (interview) points to much more pressing problems, which need much great-
er political will to be successfully solved: a) low contribution rate; b) short accumulation 
period, especially for women; c) high downside risk. As can be readily seen, all three stem 
directly from past policy compromises, which take some time to generate negative side 
effects, but which are then extremely difficult to reverse.
As of April 2007, average monthly contributions to Croatian mandatory pension funds 
amounted to €31.2, which is a very low figure not capable of granting a reasonable com-
pensation for falling net replacement rates in the public pillar. All pension fund managing 
companies are aware of the problem, a solution to which is still out of sight. The corre-
lation with public pillar issues is here most visible: HDZ squandering of pension savings 
as well as more and more promises to ‘new’ pensioners unequivocally contradict the will 
to increase contributions to the second pillar, vaguely contained in the Strategic Frame-
work for Development 2006-2013 (Vlada RH, 2006:48). In fact, each percentage increase 
would cost the government some €100 million, not a viable option under current circum-
stances (Matković, 2006a).
More or less the same holds for the accumulation period, especially of women. Thanks 
to successful opposition during the legislative phase, an equalisation of retirement ages at 
65 was prevented. The problem is of course more complex, since Croatia faces a demo-
graphic catastrophe shared only by a dozen or so countries in the world, thus the idea of 
increasing the minimum pensionable age to 67 or 68 is being considered. An a priori op-
position has already been voiced by most trade unions (Matković, 2006c).
With respect, instead, to the downside risk of these funds, the problem mainly lies 
in the high correlation of asset classes within their portfolios (Kotlikoff, 1999:19). Thus 
investment limits relaxation, allowing for greater risk diversification, is a move into the 
right direction. 
2.10.3 Evolution of independent agencies and public administration lobby
The three institutions concerned – Regos, Hagena, HZMO – all underwent major re-
structuring since the implementation of the public pillar. However, only Regos, the most 
efficient and innovative, fell prey to bureaucratic capture by other, annexed agencies, such 
as HZZO, Fina and the Tax Administration.
Hagena was established as an independent agency rather instrumentally, in order to 
monitor the nascent pension fund market. Once the system started operating smoothly, 
the necessity for an integrated approach emerged, especially due to the overlap of super-
vision and regulation regarding investment and pension funds. Three agencies (Hagena, 
the Directorate for the Supervision of Insurance Companies and the Croatian Commis-
sion for Securities) had been merged by the beginning of 2006 into Hanfa, the Croatian 
Financial Services Supervisory Agency (OG, 140/05), which developed a functional in-
ternal separation of duties: risk assessment, licensing etc.
With respect to Regos, instead, agency capture can be plainly invoked. By Septem-
ber 2006, the very successful agency correctly assigned 99,42% of contributions to sec-140
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ond pillar individual accounts and its efficiency was at least partially responsible for a 
huge contribution collection coverage increase, thereby practically annulling transition 
costs for the 5% second pillar. Therefore, plans to create a single database for all payroll 
contributions and taxes were naturally assigning Regos a central role. This ambitious plan 
was, however, foiled by 2005 and Regos’s existence is now threatened. 
The two events are uncorrelated. Regos’ database functions were relegated to first 
and second pillar contributions as of 2005 (OG 177/04) and the story is so far not public. 
The official explanation is the incompatibility between their datasets and those used by 
the Tax Administration (Bejaković, interview); however, a more plausible cause may be 
agency capture by the Tax Administration, HZMO and Fina which pressured the govern-
ment – a relatively easy task with the HDZ – to maintain their own data collection func-
tions, which, if lost, would have threatened hundreds of inefficient workplaces (Matković, 
interview). This loss of influence by Regos had a temporary negative effect on contribu-
tion collection, which slumped in 2005. However, preliminary data for 2006 showed a 
resumption of the positive trend towards increased compliance, which may indicate that 
individualisation rather than administrative efficiency chiefly underpins normative legit-
imation of the new pension system (Anušić, interview).
With respect to future plans for Regos, the issue is still being debated. Regos is rel-
atively expensive, costing HRK 100-120M per annum (although most of this money is 
paid for outsourced services performed by Fina), and it is financed through the general 
budget. It is imperative that part of these costs be borne by the insured who are ultimately 
benefiting from its services. However, there is no consensus on the practicalities and the 
options are either to merge Regos with Fina, privatise it or finance it entirely with pen-
sion contributions (Matković, 2006a). 
3. Actors and institutions
3.1 Political parties
Not unexpectedly, the weaknesses of the Croatian party system are reflected in the 
involution that its pension schemes are undergoing since independence. As in other post-
communist countries, the élitisation of Croatian politics widened, instead of bridging, the 
gap between civil society and political expression. Within this context, the electoral defeat 
of the SKH-SDP at the Croatian founding elections marked the emergence of HDZ’s au-
tocratic and populist style, which mixed clientelism and servility with extreme brutality.
As ialready mentioned, a delegitimated single-party system was replaced by a sin-
gle-party nation-state, which drifted during the 1990s towards authoritarianism based on 
clientelistic favours and the almost perfect identification of the party with the state appa-
ratus. Since HDZ, however, was not a communist successor party, the persistence of pre-
vious networks, which characterises countries where a ‘ruptura pactada’ was negotiated, 
was in Croatia hardly automatic. Former elites were given the option to be co-opted or, 
alternatively, destroyed. Unsurprisingly, the corporatist arena - the specific way of organ-
ising industrial relations that includes all those actors (social partners) involved in social 
dialogue (employers, government, trade unions); as opposed to the political/electoral are-
na - was promptly wiped out.141
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Hence, the HDZ found itself in an ambiguous situation. On the one hand, it had ample 
leeway unilaterally to impose unpopular measures on the population, as for example with 
the Valentić decrees. On the other hand, it had continually to legitimise itself by granting 
favours to special interest groups, which managed to seize huge economic benefits, albeit 
in a very unstable environment. As Bićanić and Franičević (2003) correctly emphasise, the 
delegitimation of HDZ was at the end of the 1990s dual: Tuđman’s party betrayed public 
expectations and it did not provide adequate guarantees to its cronies.
In any case, these peculiarities rendered the ambitious 1998-1999 pension reform 
possible, but they also transmitted various elements of uncertainty, which are slowly un-
dermining the system’s solidity. Radical moves, such as the creation of a German point-
based public pillar, the obfuscation of the Actual Pension Value and the introduction of 
‘Croatian indexation’ were accompanied with limitations to second pillar expansion, pres-
ervation of privileges and widespread exceptions.
Tuđman’s death and the HDZ’s deep crisis brought an end to Croatian ‘demo-kratu-
ra’. The winning coalition the HSLS-SDP promised a thorough change in policymaking 
style, but is soon replicated some of the HDZ’s negative traits and was therefore before 
long kicked out of office. The major achievement of the SDP era was a substantial im-
provement of relations with IFIs and the launch of Croatia’s bid to join the EU. Domesti-
cally, performance was underwhelming and it chiefly hints at the systemic and endemic 
nature of Croatian clientelism, which prevents sound policies being implemented when-
ever a strong hands-tying arrangement is missing.
With respect to pension reforms, the emergence of the pensioners’ party the HSU as a 
shameless single-issue formation contaminated the new reform concepts with old practice. 
HSU’s boldness48 was only matched by the incompetence of its leaders. Their dubious sup-
port for any coalition struggling for power (SDP in 2000 and HDZ in 2004), turned reform 
implementation into a farce and transformed the Croatian pension system into a cashbox 
from which to distribute political favours. Whereas supplements and increases character-
ised the SDP interlude, PM Sanader’s government not only settled the pensioner debt is-
sue, but is now, entirely for electoral purposes, trying to invert its own pension reform by 
solving the ‘new’ pensioners problem. In addition, Ivica Račan’s premature death in April 
2007 deprived the SDP of a credible candidate for the incoming electoral bout.
3.2 External actors
The World Bank played in Croatia a pivotal role in pushing for multipillar pension 
reforms. The influence of Croatian émigrés to Chile, the secondment of a Croatian World 
Bank official (Zoran Anušić) to the Plenipotentiary for pension reform and the absence 
of competing agencies, such as the EU (absent due to Croatia’s negative political record), 
meant that the road for pension privatisation was paved. Right after the Homeland War, 
the economic situation recovered up until 1999, when the fiscal deficit spun out of con-
trol. During this period, however, relations with the Bank were rather problematic, as the 
HDZ refused to carry out some important economic and sector work (ESW) tasks such 
48 During local elections in May 2005, many HSU members got elected on centre-left election tickets only to 
support HDZ and right-wing parties during the forming of regional and municipal coalition governments.142
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as public expenditure reviews and a poverty assessment. The Bank rated the overall out-
come of its assistance program as unsatisfactory until at least 2001.
Therefore, it is hardly plausible to talk of strong social conditionality on the Bank’s 
behalf. In the Croatian case, an overwhelming information asymmetry probably played a 
greater role, since neither social partners nor academia managed to voice a consistent op-
position to the government’s plan. The absence of any alternative reform proposals and 
the failure to involve young generations in the pension reform debate are good proxies 
for this lack of knowledge and interest, as well as indicators of the still underdeveloped 
Croatian civil society.
3.3 Trade unions
Among the factors accounting for the decline of the Croatian corporatist arena the con-
frontational stance of HDZ during the 1990s emerges as key. However, structural features 
are also to blame. High unemployment, the informalisation of the economy, flexible work 
arrangements, as well as a very precarious financial situation are all responsible for the 
understaffing, atomisation and low bargaining power of the Croatian labour movement.
Croatian trade union confederations, headed by SSSH, were unprepared for pension 
reforms. They were at the same time busy with the implementation of the new Labour 
Code and they did not view pension reforms as something directly concerning their declin-
ing membership base. Thus, an important opportunity to voice their interests was missed, 
because of their rather inflexible interpretation of pensions as having negative distribu-
tional impacts on labour policies.
Ubi major minor cessat, as the problem of ‘new’ pensioners emerged in full, trade 
union confederations set aside their perennial disputes and compactly voiced their oppo-
sition to the 1999-introduced pension formula. Again, however, they probably could not 
see the wood for the trees, as continuous interference with pension details only augments 
the system’s complexity and obscurity, instead of frontally tackling the vestiges of past 
privilege which survived since socialist times. 
3.4 The Constitutional Court
As in many other Eastern European countries, the Constitutional Court of Croatia 
played a disproportionably important role (by Western standards) during the pension re-
form process. Insufficiently researched, this aspect of Hirschmann’s voice has at least two 
causes in the Croatian case. First, the inaccessibility of government by civil society groups 
forces them to seek alternative routes to push for their interests. Second, the HDZ’s au-
thoritarian regression very much blurred the tripartition of power and the Constitutional 
Court wanted to reassert its independence in a radical fashion.
The final result was, however, doubly negative. On the one hand, the Court was down-
graded in its role of guardian of the Constitution, as it asserted itself as a defender of pop-
ular interests and was lately flooded with cases on the most trivial matters. On the other 
hand, the damage inflicted by the recognition of the pensioner debt was not only fiscal, as 
an important part of budgetary savings have been squandered for consumption, but also 
moral, since interest groups (especially representatives of ‘new’ pensioners) feel entitled 143
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to ask for compensation, which may in the end render reforms self-defeating as they pro-
gressively lose normative legitimation.
3.5 Financial actors and public sector agencies
Rather unexpectedly, financial actors did not influence the legislative phase of re-
forms. Two facts account for that: the triviality of asset management business in Croatia 
before the establishment of mandatory pension funds, which did not materialise in a coor-
dinated lobbying effort, and the insulation of policymaking within the Plenipotentiary. 
The situation, of course, radically changed after implementation started in early 2002. 
Four mandatory pension funds emerged after two years of competition and they organised 
themselves in an associated lobby at national and European levels. However, their efforts 
were not very successful, although collaboration with the regulatory agency Hanfa is sat-
isfactory. Apart from some openings on the government’s behalf, regarding the relaxation 
of investment restrictions, various issues are lingering at the margins of the agenda. The 
main problems are political and hence unlikely to be implemented, such as the increase 
in contribution rates for the funded pillar and an elongation of the contribution period, es-
pecially for women. The main cleavage within the association is represented by the juxta-
position of the two smaller and two larger funds. The automatic distribution mechanism 
of new entrants is at the centre of this dispute.
As regards the socialist inheritance, Croatia is burdened by an inefficient public ad-
ministration, overlapping core functions of government and a cumbersome judiciary. One 
of the noblest attempts by the World Bank was to reorganise the revenue side of the budg-
et as a corollary to reforms of the pension system. Regos, the Central Registry of Insured 
Persons, proved to be a very competent institution, which helped the smooth implemen-
tation of the funded pillar in Croatia and radically simplified employers’ reporting duties. 
However, its wider objectives directly conflicted with the interests of employees in the 
Tax Administration, Fina and other specialised agencies. Although the full story is not yet 
public, rationalisation was cut short in 2005 within polemics on the low cost-effectiveness 
of the institution. Its fate is currently under debate.
4 Conclusions
The Croatian post-socialist pension system is probably the one which suffered the 
most from transition-induced overstretching. Between 1992 and 1996 employment fell 
by at least 25% in Croatia (429,753 fewer workers), while the number of pensioners in-
creased from 691,021 in 1991 to more than a million a decade later. 
In order to prevent costs from skyrocketing, PM Valentić implemented a radical sta-
bilisation package in October 1993, which drastically limited indexation, thereby trigger-
ing the collapse of net replacement rates. Thus, once the Croatian economy started to re-
cover, the pension system was completely delegitimated in the eyes of the public, as all 
major surveys show. On the one hand, its performance was abysmal as average pensions 
barely ensured subsistence. On the other hand, special privileges (early retirement rights, 
higher benefits for particular groups) were largely retained if not, in some cases, expand-
ed. Basically, the system was deprived of defendants, thereby rendering a paradigmat-144
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ic change in favour of individualised private accounts a very palatable option. However, 
Croatian reforms were chiefly corrupted by their time inconsistency. 
As has been shown in the preceding paragraphs, the Croatian pension system under-
went major special interest group pressures, which both during the legislative and imple-
mentation phases weakened its long-term political sustainability. Croatian politicians, 
both from HDZ and SDP, did not heed the World Bank’s primary recommendation, that 
is, no more populism in the public pillar. The Croatian example well shows the correla-
tion between public and private pillar issues, meaning that political risk is never elimi-
nated from the agenda.
The mechanisms that lead towards an institutional degeneration of the private pillar 
are related to both agency and structure. Giving in to interest group pressures not only 
deprived the government of important sources of revenues that could be used for the de-
velopment of the funded pillar, but it also undermined the normative legitimation of the 
new system, as more groups feel entitled to demand greater compensation of losses. In 
addition, the socialist legacy put reforms on shaky legs, since transition costs limited the 
contribution rate to a mere 5%, the underdevelopment of financial markets prevented a 
satisfactory diversification of risk, and the insignificance of the Croatian capital market 
allowed for the successful operation of just four funds, leaving the system perennially ex-
posed to oligopolistic threats.
 As 2007, another electoral year, is advancing, the pension system is again becoming 
a major legitimising instrument in the hands of the incumbent HDZ. PM Sanader’s party 
is once more trying to exploit the system for short-term electoral advantages, by promis-
ing to solve the ‘new’ pensioner issue. If there is a move, which may nullify all the efforts 
made so far, well, the wrong handling of this issue may well be it. 
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